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ABSTRACT
This study aims at examining the different frames used by the governmental newspaper
“Al Ahram” and the independent newspaper “Al Masry Elyoum” in covering anti-Coptic attacks
in Egypt from 2011 till 2017, under two different ruling regimes. The researcher conducted a
content analysis of 553 news stories that were published a week after each attack. The researcher
aimed at exploring the different frames used by each newspaper, whether those frames have varied
along the different ruling periods, or across different newspaper ownership. The study has also
examined the frame context used by newspapers to frame the attacks and the dominant news
sources attributed by journalists in the coverage of the attacks. The study has further examined
how the different news sources affected the type of frame, and finally the impact of different ruling
periods on the attribution of blame. The results have shown that both newspapers relied mostly on
the morality frame in their portrayal of the attacks. The results have further indicated that the use
of some frames like the morality frame, the conflict frame and the economic consequences frame
have not differed across both newspapers. The first has been the mostly used and the latter has
been the least used. However, the attribution of responsibility frame has been used more by the
independent newspaper, while the war on terror frame has been used more by the governmental
newspaper. The use of frames have also differed across different ruling periods. For instance, under
Mubarak’s regime, the attacks were framed using the morality frame; while under Sisi’s regime,
the attacks were framed using the war on terror frame. The results have also shown that the overall
frame context in the press coverage of the anti-Coptic attacks has been the thematic frame.
Previous research has indicated an increase in the use of official sources, since they are perceived
as the most credible sources. The findings of the study support those findings, since official sources
v

have dominated more than half the coverage. The research has further indicated that some sources
played a significant role in framing anti-Coptic attacks. As for the attribution of blame, the findings
suggest that under Mubarak’s ruling period, the blame was mainly on foreign agents, while under
Sisi’s ruling period, the blame was pointed at terrorists.
Keywords: anti-Coptic attacks, Egypt, newspapers, framing, sourcing
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“In a civilized society, diversity in religious orientation should be the reason for celebration, not
the cause for hatred and differentiation.”
(Abhijit Naskar, Illusion of Religion: A Treatise on Religious Fundamentalism)

Recently, terrorism has earned and continues to earn a great deal of media coverage,
especially after the September 11 attacks in USA (Zeng and Tahat 2012). As a result, various
media scholars have been interested in examining the press coverage of terrorism and terrorist
attacks (Zeng and Tahat 2012). Moreover, as the threat of terrorism is increasing, the public’s need
for extensive information is also increasing in order to reduce their concerns about the issue and
its danger (Zeng and Tahat 2012). Therefore, a lot of media research has been dedicated to
examining whether the media provide accurate and unbiased information when they are reporting
terrorism issues (Zeng and Tahat 2012). The importance of examining the press coverage of
terrorist attacks is owing to the significant role played by press in creating the public perception
about the incident (Zeng and Tahat 2012). For example, News editors determine which issues are
considered more prominent through controlling the position and prevalence of topics (Zeng and
Tahat 2012). Furthermore, journalists are able to impact the salience of the topic, as well as its
content, by using certain news frames to highlight certain aspects of the story and neglect others
(Zeng and Tahat 2012). Accordingly, examining the news frames and the agenda in press coverage
of terrorist attacks is essential in order to understand how the public perceive those events (Zeng
and Tahat 2012).
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Although the media is supposed to provide “a forum for the society’s diverse segments” and
fulfill the role of the public watchdog, it is still difficult to perform both functions in a society that
has great sociopolitical struggle, or a battle between religious and secular forces (Evans and
Kaynak 2015). Additionally, despite the fact that many studies have focused on examining the
relationship between the media and terrorism, there are still a few studies that have focused on
examining media coverage of terrorism in the Arab and Muslim countries that are witnessing
intensifying terrorism and violence against Coptic Christians.

1.1 The Egyptian Copts under Mubarak’s Regime
Under Mubarak’s regime, there were various inefficiencies in the Egyptian secular model,
where the quality of secular protection was deemed as superficial and declining (Farha and Moussa
2015). Moreover, the administration at that time was constantly inciting violence towards the
Coptic minorities in order to shift the attention of the public from criticizing the regime. This has
reflected a discrepancy from the view that Mubarak was the protector of all of the Egyptians (Farha
and Moussa 2015). Brownlee (2013) has further added that when the violence against Copts
intensified, Mubarak took this Coptic insecurity to his advantage. He used it to emphasize the rule
of law and expanded his authoritarianism. Ironically, Mubarak has based his regime “as the
firewall against sectarianism” instead of focusing his efforts on creating equality between Muslims
and Christians. He has claimed that without his administration, the Copts would have been left to
the hands of Islamist, anti –Coptic regime (Brownlee 2012).
According to Tadros (2013), the nature of attacks against Egyptian Copts in Mubarak’s era
has been different from the communal violence that has occurred under Sadat’s rule. This is due
to the fact that the sectarian violence has spread to include the Copts’ private businesses, besides
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the Coptic places of worship. Such attacks have been initiated by Islamic militants in areas that
differ from the ones they came from. Thus, they have been viewed as “aliens” in the communities
that they erupt (Tadros 2012). Tadros (2013) has further added that Under Mubarak, religious
intolerance became internally diffused rather than externally induced. Thus, indicating that the
social relations between citizens by that time was characterized by religious polarization.
By the 1990s, Mubarak’s security forces succeeded in repressing Islamic radicals of “al-Jamaa
al- Islamiyya” who targeted foreign tourists, regime officials and Egyptian Copts (Brownlee 2012).
This authoritarian rule has claimed to save the Copts from the “Islamic threat”. Meanwhile, the
same forces that have destroyed the Islamic radicals, represented a threat to Egyptian civilians
(Brownlee 2012). Rowee (2009) has further explained that the rise of conflicts and violence, as
well as the coercion and repression of the regime’s Islamist advocates, is a prominent trend that
has indicated an “increasing insecurity of an authoritarian regime determined to maintain
monopoly on power”.
Brownlee (2012) has indicated that under Mubarak’s era, the regime has partially played a
role in incidents that killed more Christians than any anti-Coptic attacks in the Egyptian modern
history. For example, in 1998, security officials of “el Kosheh” town were responsible for torturing
hundreds of Copts during the investigations of the murder of two other Copts (Brownlee 2012).
Moreover, in 2000, there was a fight between two merchants in El Kosheh village, one was Muslim
and the other was Coptic (Brownlee 2012). The majority of Kosheh citizens were Copts by that
time, so Muslims from nearby villages headed towards El Kosheh to fight Copts (Brownlee 2012).
The fight has resulted in destroying the Copts’ homes and stores, in addition to attacking the local
Copts (Brownlee 2012). The fight has also resulted in killing Twenty Copts before the intervention
of the ministry of interior (Brownlee 2012). Mubarak’s security officials reacted to the incident by
3

exacerbating the Copts and abandoning the scene when the conflict escalated (Brownlee 2012). In
addition to that, the Egyptian Copts who endured assaults have not found justice in courts as the
perpetrators of the Copts in Kosheh incident have not been convicted (Brownlee 2012).
Additionally, in 2010, two other deadly attacks against Egyptian Copts took place (Brownlee
2012). In January, there was an attack on Coptic worshipers in Naga Hammadi, where six Copts
were shot in Christmas Eve as they left the church (Brownlee 2012). Moreover, a Coptic man was
shot down by the police in “Al Omraniya” in a conflict over building a church on a land that was
basically licensed to be a community center (Brownlee 2012). Like all the previous incidents, the
government’s reaction was denying that the incidents’ motive can be sectarian (Tadros 2013). The
government even blamed the incidents on “foreign fingers” that probably aimed at provoking
uprisings, hoping that these incidents’ file would be closed as soon as possible so that the state
could continue promoting the image of Egypt that is characterized by “national unity” (Tadros
2013).
Other anti-Coptic attacks that took place under Mubarak’s regime were in 2011. There was a
massive explosion at Saint Mark and Pope Peter’s (The two saints) Coptic Church in Alexandria
that happened due to a car Bomb (Brownlee 2012). The attack has resulted in killing 23 Christians,
and injuring dozens of other Christians, while shattering the regime’s claim of keeping the Copts
safe and secure (Brownlee 2012). According to Brownlee (2012) “The New Year’s attack exposed
Copts’ continuing vulnerability, despite living in a security state with a powerful chief executive
and a sprawling Ministry of Interior. Egyptians were horrified and outraged. Security officers have
not only failed to intercept the bomber, but they also stood by afterwards as Christians and Muslims
scuffled in the surrounding area”.
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In brief, the status of Copts under Mubarak’s regime was indifferent throughout the years. By
that time, Mubarak and his government officials have seemed to only be interested in preserving
their power rather than protecting Egyptian Copts (Brownlee 2012). Moreover, Tadros (2013)
suggested that the series of anti-Coptic attacks in Mubarak’s era indicate an ongoing pattern of the
government’s failure to handle the attacks, prevent their occurrence, or even provide a useful
resolution to such conflicts.

1.2 The Egyptian Copts post Mubarak’s Era
According to Tadros (2013), the mass protests that have been led by Egyptian Copts after the
bombing of “The Two Saints Church” in Alexandria, in addition to other political, economic and
social factors have altogether paved the road for the 25th of January uprisings. Various Egyptian
Copts have organized and participated in the revolution, despite the opposition of the Coptic
Church by that time (Tadros 2013). Moreover, the Egyptian Copts have constituted a big part of
the Egyptian revolution, where both Muslims and Christians were “Unified by a common goal to
rid the country of Mubarak. Egyptians were able, for eighteen days, to put aside religious prejudice
and construct a socio-political culture that was inclusive and pluralistic” (Tadros 2013).
After Mubarak has been ousted, the Islamists started to attest the story of the revolution,
excluding the role of Copts, the youth, and the liberals, proclaiming themselves as the “guardians”
of the revolution (Tadros 2013). Moreover, in the days that followed Mubarak’s ousting, the Tahrir
Square’s mood and spirit has completely changed in apparent ways (Tadros 2013). The main stage
has been set by the Muslim Brothers, who denied access to the youth coalitions that led the
revolution (Tadros 2013). Additionally, the slogans have even changed from “raise your head high
5

you’re Egyptian” to “raise your head high you’re a Muslim”. They have, also, changed from
“madaniyah, madaniyah” to “islamiyah, islamiyah” (Tadros 2013). The Islamists have even
literally thrown the Copts out of Tahrir square (Tadros 2013).
The Egyptian Copts have been isolated and endangered even after the ousting of President
Mubarak and during the few months post the revolution. According to Brownlee (2012), the few
months post Mubarak have witnessed a wave of kidnappings to the Egyptian Copts, which revealed
their continuous vulnerability even after the revolution. Since the officials of Mubarak’s regime
have deliberately set confined prisoners free in an attempt to disrupt the uprising, the country’s
public security has totally collapsed by that time (Brownlee 2012). The Copts of Upper Egypt were
then the easiest targets since they were the weakest class in Egypt and they were not protected by
the state (Brownlee 2012). By that time, Various Egyptian Copts in Minya, Sohag, Asyut and Qena
were abducted and kept until their families paid ransoms (Brownlee 2012). Ironically, the state
was encouraging the Christian victims to reconcile with the kidnappers instead of prosecuting
them, which has indeed left Christians more vulnerable (Brownlee 2012).
More violent attacks against Copts were committed in March 2011, where there was a fight
between Muslims and Copts in “Atfeeh, Helwan” that has resulted in setting a church on fire, and
thirteen people died while protesting over the arson (Brownlee 2012). Furthermore, in May 2011,
there were clashes between Copts and Muslims in “Imbaba” over the rumor of “an interfaith
marriage”, which resulted in the death of four Copts and nine Muslims, in addition to setting two
Churches on fire (Brownlee 2012). Consequently, thousands of Copts rushed in front of “Maspero”
and camped out for several days, demanding that the “Supreme Council of the Armed Forces”
(SCAF) ensures the security of the Copts and the Coptic churches (Brownlee 2012). The
“Maspero” Massacre was one of the most famous violent attacks against Copts post the revolution.
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Once again, in October, and after a church in Aswan was set on fire; the Copts rushed in front of
“Maspero” again demanding their safety (Brownlee 2012). Before reaching the building, the large
vehicles of the army broke into the crowd, and thugs started to barrage them with projectiles from
nearby rooftops (Brownlee 2012). During that time, the state television was claiming that the
protesters initiated violence, and were inciting their audience to take the SCAf’s side, and the army
reacted to the incident by claiming that their soldiers have panicked (Brownlee 2012).
Additionally, instead of taking the soldiers into court, the protestors have been accused and have
been taken for military trials (Brownlee 2012).
According to Tadros (2013), post Mubarak’s era has paved the way for a more peaceful
relationship between the Islamists, who were by that time getting closer to power, and the Coptic
citizens. By that time, the Islamists made several attempts to ensure that the Egyptian Copts would
enjoy their full rights of security if they came to power (Tadros 2013). On the other hand, when
“Morsi”, a member of the Muslim brotherhood, came into power, other anti-Coptic attacks took
place (Brownlee 2012). For example, in April 2013, five Copts were shot and killed in “alKhusus”, at greater Cairo (Brownlee 2012). The attacks at “Al khusus” continued as mourners
spread rushed to St. Mark’s Church in Abbasiyah (Brownlee 2012). The state security reacted by
sending a large group of thugs in a siege to those who gathered to mourn the victims (Brownlee
2012).
In summer 2013, the former Egyptian president “Mohamed Morsi” was removed from office,
and Egyptian Copts were under the rule of a new president but with the same old problems.
According to Aras and Bardakci (2014), the violence against Egyptian Copts has only seemed to
increase, and Egypt has been witnessing the strongest wave of militant violence since the 1990s.
The prosecution of jailing Copts has increased, and Christians became more insecure since they
7

were viewed by Islamists, who were furious about the church supporting the military, as
“scapegoats” (Aras and Bardakci 2014).
Brownlee (2013) has further added that the state’s indifference and the Islamists’ grievances
have fueled more violence against Christians. For example, in July 2013, a church was
intentionally set on fire in south “Al Minya”, and another one in “Marsa Matrouh” was vandalized
(Brownlee 2013). Furthermore, four Copts were beaten to death by a mob, who also destroyed
twenty four Copts’ properties in the village of “Nag Hassan” near “Luxor” (Brownlee 2013). In
some cases, the Islamists were the ones responsible for such acts; however, according to Brownlee
(2013), the “law official enforcement often enabled the attacks”. For example, after the incident
of “Nag Hassan”, the head of security of “Luxor” government said that it is not the police’s duty
to intervene and prevent killings, but it is rather to investigate after the incident (Brownlee 2013).
Not only did the attacks against Coptic churches and properties increase after Morsi, but also cases
of kidnapping Copts increased. According to Brownlee (2013), another two Copts were kidnapped
in “Northen Sinai” in July 2014, and were then slaughtered because their families did not pay the
ransom.
On December 11th, 2016, the Coptic Cathedral in “Abbasiya” witnessed a suicide bombing
where, according to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), 26 Copts were killed and more than 45 Copts
were injured while attending the usual Sunday prayers. The Egyptian Copts were then furious
about the lack of security measures, and protestors broke out, clashing with security services, and
demanding the removal of the Minister of Interior (Africa Research Bulletin 2017). Afterwards,
there have often been concerns about the increased discrimination against Copts in Egypt (Africa
Research Bulletin 2017).
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In April 2017, the president “Abdel Fattah Al Sisi” declared a three months state of emergency
after a series of simultaneous attacks targeting Christian worshippers in “Tanta” and “Alexandria”.
According to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), 27 Copts were killed and at least 78 were injured
in an explosion that took place in “Saint Goerge” church in “Tanta”. A few seconds later, 17 Copts
were killed and 48 were injured in a second explosion at “Saint Mark’s Cathedral” in “Alexandria”
(Africa Research Bulletin 2017).
The Copts in Egypt have always suffered from the state’s failure to ensure their security.
Though they have gone under the spectrum of various leaders, some anti-Islamists like Mubarak
and other elected Islamist like Morsi, and finally, the military rule of president Sisi; still all of these
leaders have not efficiently contributed to their safety.

1.3 The Research Significance
The print media plays a significant role in framing and constructing the issue of religious
Sectarianism (Mohieddin et. al). Various scholars have argued that the print media can
sometimes be used as a means for promoting peace (Jan and Khan 2011). There have been
various efforts to endorse the use of journalism in facilitating conflict resolution (Jan and Khan
2011). When the journalists report conflicts objectively, become impartial when they portray the
parties involved in the conflict, and become submissively watchful when it comes up to
promoting peaceful means of resolving conflicts without taking sides; this can be referred to as
“peace journalism” (Jan and Khan 2011).
While the press can contribute to improving the relationships between different religious
comminutes through promoting religious tolerance, it can also have a negative impact when it
reinforces stereotypes that might encourage violence against religious minorities (Mohieddin et.
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al). It is also worth noting that until a very recent time, the media was not allowed to publish
issues related to religious minorities, which could be interpreted by the Copts as being biased
(Mohieddin et. al). Furthermore, when the press discuss the issues of sectarian violence, it can
provide a profound analysis of the underlying gaps in the rights of religious minorities, or it can
further conceal them through inaccurate, biased or misleading coverage (Mohieddin et. al). This
can, in turn, affect the public’s attitudes towards religious minorities, and can also affect the
public policy for better or worse (Mohieddin et. al).

An ample amount of research has been done to examine the press coverage of terrorist attacks.
On the other hand, when it comes to anti-Coptic terrorism, especially in the Middle East,
information relating to how the press portrays anti-Coptic attacks is inadequate. Therefore, this
study draws on the framing theory and uses the content analysis methodology to analyze how the
Egyptian press frame anti-Coptic attacks in Egypt in the period between 2011 and 2017.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Defining Terrorism and its Causes
The previous literature about terrorism has shown that scholars have not yet agreed on how to
define the term itself, although they all agreed that political groups have been using it for almost
two thousand years (Lentini 2008). Furthermore, there is no consensus among some bureaucracies
of individual states as to how to define terrorism (Lentini 2008). For example, in the United States,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Department of Defense
have different definitions of what constructs terrorism, according to the operation and the areas of
competence of each (Lentini 2008).
According to Lentini (2008), terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon; thus, unsurprisingly so
many agencies are involved. He has also added that “It shares many qualities with military and
paramilitary groups’ actions, as well as criminal organizations and activities”. Likewise, Lutz et.
al (2005) have argued that there are over one hundred definitions for terrorism designed for
different purposes such as being used in the court law, or for reaching international consensus
regarding an ambiguous task. Furthermore, they defined terrorism as an act which “relies on
violence or the threat of violence to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the
immediate victims of the violence”. On the other hand, Hoffman (2006) has demonstrated that
terrorism is all about power; “the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power
to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence or, equally important, the threat of violence
used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim”. Previous studies have not only
addressed how to define terrorism, but have also tried to articulate its causes. Basuchoudhary and
Shughart (2010) have noted that religious, ethnic and linguistic polarization within a country
11

increases its susceptibility of being victimized by terrorist groups. They have also added that such
polarized countries are more likely to encounter domestic violence and civil war. Moreover, the
historical analysis of the terrorist waves around the globe can be tracked by the ethnic disputes
created before the First World War (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010). In fact, the release of the
religious and ethnic separation in Central Asia and the Middle East upon the downfall of the Soviet
Union has provided better understanding for the reasons behind modern terrorist activities
(Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010).
Additionally, Kurrild-Klitgaard et. al (2006) have suggested a positive correlation between
religious and ethnic fragmentation, on one hand, and the terrorist activities on the other hand. They
have argued that creating religious and ethnic tensions and emphasizing differences among groups
cultivates the outrage which results from the feeling of being discriminated and underprivileged in
the status quo. Thus, other religious and ethnic groups direct domestic violence as a means to
capture power (Enders and Sandler, 2006).
In an attempt to examine how ethnic social fragmentation fuels terrorist attacks, Ozdogan
(2008) suggests that the rational actors, who manipulate the religious and nationalistic sentiments
and the socioeconomic conditions, change the ethnic social fragments into separated and polarized
forces to serve their own agendas. For example, the Turkish leadership manipulates the
socioeconomic dispossession of impoverished Kurds, Al Qaeda manipulates religious sentiments,
and the Nazis manipulate their community’s nationalistic sentiments (Ozdogan 2008). If the state
fails to defend the rights of its ethnic groups; then, it will help those rational actors to maneuver
these ethnic differences to serve their own agendas (Ozdogan 2008).

On the other hand,

Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) suggest that institutions have a significant role in dampening
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ethnic fractionalization. The devaluation of the governmental laws can fuel violence against
minorities and foster the breakdown of the social order (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010).
Overall, religiously and ethnically fragmented countries are found to be more susceptible to
be victimized by terrorist attacks. While rational actors can manipulate such fragments to serve
and foster their own ideologies, strong institutions can avoid the negative consequences of these
fragments by preserving the rights of the minorities.

2.2 Terrorism and the Media
Terrorism scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, has explained the relationship between terrorism
and the media, illustrating that they are “bound together in an inherently symbiotic relationship,
each feeding of and exploiting the other for their purposes” (Qtd in Banlaoi 2009). Since Media is
believed to be the main channel that links the terrorists to their audience, Margret Thatcher, the
former British Prime Minister, has explained that the media to the terrorists acts as “the oxygen”
to their publicity (Banlaoi 2009). In other words, there is a mutual relationship between the media
and the terrorists, to the extent that terrorists would have invented the media if the media were
nonexistent (Banlaoi 2009).
According to Papacharissi and Oliveira, terrorist attacks maintain the sympathetic elements
of news such as relevance, drama, and sympathetic visuals, which makes them more newsworthy
(2008). In the past, and even in the new era, terrorist organizations have been aware of these news
values, which increases their efficiency in exploiting news agencies to foster their agendas
(Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). It has been further argued that media coverage of terrorist attacks
is essential, as it represents the social context of terrorist attacks and “confers status” consequent
to the terrorists’ causes (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). Moreover, Patrick (2014) has argued
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that since media influences how people make sense out of events, it also benefits the “rhetorical
needs of terrorism”. Similarly, Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008) have further explained that news
coverage is important to terrorists since it affects how their acts are perceived by the audience.
Thus, the “rhetorical progression” of the terrorist attacks’ coverage impacts “the level of
demonization or glorification that ensues for various parties within the public”. This means that
the audience’s perception of terrorism and terrorist attacks is impacted by the “rhetorical biases”
of the press that covers the terrorist attacks.
According to Surette et al (2009), the focus on portraying terrorist attacks has been increasing
in the contemporary era. It has developed from merely reporting and covering the event and its
consequences, to exerting more effort in tracking those radical groups to achieve a closer depiction
of their targets and strategies. Furthermore, BadrEldin (2014) has explained that the reason behind
such focus on terrorist groups and terrorist attacks might be that it serves the political goals of a
certain party. For example, some political parties attempt to demonize the opposing ones through
depicting them as terrorists (BadrEldin 2014).
The relationship between the media, terrorism and the government can be illustrated in what
Morin described as a “symbiotic relationship” where the three work together to achieve their goals
(2016). The media outlets demand ratings to be able to withstand the high competition in the news
industry, while the terrorist groups need the media to publicize their acts and activities, to maintain
their goal of frightening and terrorizing the public; while finally the government seeks advocacy
and rapport to their policies to fight terrorism (Morin 2016).
The role of the media in news coverage of terrorism has gained much attention in the new era,
especially after the September11 incident (Iqbal 2008). Iqbal (2008) has further explained that the
world is on the way to experience a new era in the relationship between media and terrorism, in
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which one of the main targets of the terrorist groups is to gain publicity for an event or a cause,
and the media overreacts in responding to this target. He has even argued that “terrorism as a form
of communication has become an important part of contemporary discourses on terrorism and
conflict communication” (Iqbal 2008). Hence, the media acts as the perfect publicity and
propaganda tool for terrorists and their causes.
Various scholars have found it compelling to study the relationship between the media, the
society and terrorism, especially after the huge increase in terrorism activities across the world.
According to “The US Department of State”, terrorist attacks across the world have increased by
35% between 2013 and 2014. The total number of terrorism victims has also increased by more
than 80% (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of
Statistical Information, 2015). Bearing this in mind, examining the role of the media in
disseminating and propagating such trends is still considered a new field of research (Fahmy 2017).
The previous literature on terrorism and the media has relied upon the traditional approach of how
the media shapes and amplifies terrorist attacks, and has broadened the scope to include examining
how the media communicates terrorism issues. For instance, there have been studies that examined
media effects of exposure to terrorism issues that reaches local and global audience. Other studies
have examined the role of the media in covering terrorism issues, as well as the different patterns
in terrorism news coverage. Moreover, there have also been studies that examined the relationship
between online mass surveillance in preventing terrorism.
The role of terrorism images in restoring and healing solidarity in the local and global
media arena has been analyzed by Berkowitz (2017), where he applied a semiotic lens and
conducted a qualitative analysis of blogs and news reports that were related to Brussels’ terrorist
attacks in 2016. In his study, he has found that photographs, in addition to cartoons and anchoring
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texts, have the ability to construct global solidarity to fight terrorism. He has also emphasized the
importance of anchoring, explaining that it is essential for the decoding process, especially in
global photographs and cartoons, since they are not easily accessible to broader audience.
Gizzard et. al (2017) have taken a further step in examining the role of images, challenging
the common wisdom which holds that media violence results in antisocial outcomes. Their
empirical study examines whether visuals that include graphic violence lead to prosocial reactions,
like the increase in moral sensitivity. The authors have conducted two experiments using news
footage of the mass execution that was organized by The Islamic State Group (ISIS). The findings
of the study suggest that graphic media violence can sometimes act like what they refer to as “a
moral motivator”. The strong anger and disgust responses that are stimulated by the high level of
violent visuals yield a strong motivation to put an end to this violence.
Other scholars have alarmed us about the threat that terrorism news hold on civil liberties.
For example Stoycheff et. al ( 2017) have conducted an online experiment to examine the
relationship between the audience’s perception of online surveillance and their support for other
exceptional measures to prevent terrorism. The results of the study suggest that the audience’s
perception of government monitoring result in higher support for the foreign policy that restricts
online and offline civil liberties of others, including the rights to a fair trial and freedom of speech.
There have also been studies that are concerned with the relationship between terrorism coverage
and attitudes towards outgroup members. For example, Sikorski et. al (2017) have examined
whether terrorism coverage that directly links terrorism to Islam, or the Islamic State Group (ISIS),
may induce fear in non-Muslims. They have also studied the effects of news differentiation
between Muslims and Muslim terrorists through conducting a controlled experiment. The results
of the study suggest that terrorism news that does not differentiate between Muslims and Muslim
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terrorists result in negative outgroup perceptions about Muslims. The scholars have even suggested
that such perceptions might further lead to intergroup conflicts between non-Muslims and
Muslims. That is why the authors have highlighted the importance of differentiating clearly and
explicitly between Muslims and Muslim terrorists in terrorism news. They have further argued that
news differentiation would result in “a better informed and a less hostile environment”.
The impact of terrorism news on reactions toward outgroup members has further been
examined by Tamborini and Hofer (2017). They have used the proposition of the model of intuitive
morality and exemplars, which “regards moral judgment as the result of intuitive affect”, to test
the effect of terrorism news coverage on the salience of prosocial behavioral intentions and moral
intuitions towards outgroup members. To test their hypothesis, they have conducted an experiment
where participants have been randomly assigned to watch either news about the terrorist attack in
Paris 2015, or a control news story. Later on, they have measured the salience of five moral
intuition that are identified by the model of intuitive morality: fairness, loyalty, sensitivity to care,
authority, purity, and the willingness to help outgroup members. The results of the study suggest
that the exposure to terrorism news increases the salience of respect for authority, which in turn
reduces the willingness to help outgroup members.
Other scholars have found it important to examine the general patterns and trends in
terrorism news coverage. For example, Sui et. al (2017) examined the patterns of U.S terrorism
news coverage across 15 years from 1998 to 2013, providing a longitudinal view. The study has
been inspired by the recent terrorist attacks that are carried out by extremists such as the Islamic
State Group (ISIS), who has continuously worked on ensuring a high media coverage especially
among the western media outlets. The results of the study suggest that the U.S media are more
likely to cover the Islamic State Group’s non-U.S events, however, they did not find similar results
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for other prominent terrorist organizations. In other word, the findings suggest that the U.S
terrorism news coverage are determined by the event’s proximity to and affinity with the United
States, the number of U.S casualties, and weapons of mass destruction.
Generally, the previous studies provide new insights and add to the wide body of literature on
terrorism and the media. There is no doubt that in the current global society, terrorism does not
have any borders (Fahmy 2017). Therefore, scholars have increasingly recognized how crucial it
is to improve terrorism news coverage both domestically and globally (Fahmy 2017).

2.3 Framing Terrorism
The journalist’s coverage of a particular event in the newspaper can influence and determine the
audience’s perception about the event (Nevalsky 2015). One of the theories that has explained this
phenomena is the Framing Theory. It illustrates that people possess a wide range of frames, in which they
employ in the process of making sense of an event. Such frames later influence how these information are
communicated and processed (Nevalsky 2015). According to Nevalsky, applying this theory to news
coverage of events provide a better understanding of how frames used by journalists are able to influence
the readers’ perceptions (2015). Nevalsky has further explained that each journalist convey a set of frames
by keeping specific aspects of the reality in the background of the story, while stressing on other aspects
(2015). Such frames can impact the audience’s attribution to an event or even stimulate a new belief, since
journalists tend to promote a certain attribution and ignore others (Nevalsky 2015). An example of this is
the American news coverage within the cold war era, which has been dictated by the cold war frame for
various decades, to an extent that the importance of any international event was not determined by the
event’s significance, but rather by the significance of the event in relation to the cold war (Nevalsky 2015).
According to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), there are five main frames that journalists use
in their news stories:
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-

Attribution of responsibility frame – where journalists convey an issue in such a way that
attributes the responsibility or the blame of an issue to the government, a group, or an
individual.

-

Conflict frame – journalists use this frame to stress on conflicts between groups, individuals
or institutions. This frame is mainly used as a way to grab and maintain the readers’
attention.

-

Human interest frame – this frame emphasizes the “human impact” of the event. It focuses
on dramatizing, emotionalizing, or personalizing the news, while bringing the human face
of the event to the forefront of the story.

-

Economic consequence frame – journalists use this frame when they emphasize the
economic consequences of the event on individuals or institutions, or even on the whole
country.

-

Morality frame – this frame puts the event or the news into a moral or a religious context,
through raising questions that offer certain moral judgments on how we should behave.

Scholars have also conceptualized thematic and episodic frames through conducting content
analysis of newscasts (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). They have concluded that issues are
portrayed in a wider societal context in the thematic frame, while in the episodic frame, issues are
represented in a narrower context that revolves around individuals (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015).
Previous studies on terrorism and the media have employed both thematic and episodic frames,
whereby both endorse military actions and negative stereotypes (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015).
For example, a study that has been examining framing the September 11 attack in American
networks has shown that the episodic framing has prevailed the coverage. The main focus has been
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on the crime itself rather than its political and social conditions (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015).
Furthermore, other scholars have suggested that the media sometimes focus on “global macro
frames” when they report political conflicts, like for example the cold war frame (Falkheimer and
Olsson 2015). These macro frames portray specific foreign events as global problems, while
suggesting and recommending judgments about the events, in addition to fostering certain policies
as a solution (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015).
After the terrorist attacks in the United states in 9/11, scholars have observed the evolution of
a new macro frame, the “war on terror frame”, which has the ability to relate local conflicts to
international conflicts (in the September11 case, it has been linked to Al-Qaeda) (Falkheimer and
Olsson 2015). It has been further argued that such frame is often used by the media, in addition to
the government, to justify military actions, policies, and strategies in combating their opponents
(Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). Scholars have also explained that since terrorist attacks are always
known for skepticism about the identity and motives of the terrorist, journalists use the “war on
terror frame” in an attempt to answer the basic interrogation about the terrorist (Falkheimer and
Olsson 2015).

2.4 The Muslim-Coptic Relations in Egypt and Anti-Coptic Attacks
The Middle Eastern society is characterized by its wide range of ethnic and religious
communities. According to Zeidan (1999), these communities tend to “fissure in times of stress
when primordial groups’ loyalties rise to the surface”. Many states in the region have been
witnessing an utmost of the religious and ethnic apprehension of their fundamental groups in the
last decades of the twentieth century, and Egypt too has faced sectarian conflict in the last decades
(Zeidan 1999).
20

In Egypt, the two sides of the sectarian divide are Muslim Sunnis and Coptic Christians
(Zeidan 1999). The Muslim Sunnis have been the dominant group since the seventh century, and
the Copts have been the subordinate group, who are being protected by “people of the book”
(Zeidan 1999). Since then, the Copts have been enduring a transformation in relations with the
Muslims, “as periods of tolerance were interspersed with times of persecution” (Zeidan 1999).
It is clear that the relationship between Muslims and Copts in Egypt is very complex, with
deep historical and modern problems, as well as roots that are shrouded in traditional articulation
(Zeidan 1999). In the Pre-modern era, the Muslim-Copts relations have relied upon the way the
ruling elites identified Egypt, either an independent “Nile-valley entity”, or a part of the Sunni
empire (Zeidan 1999). In this era, there have been conflicting views about Egypt’s core identity
(Zeidan 1999). Some seeing it as “Western secular-liberal nationalism; others seeing it as
“pharaonic-Egyptian nationalism”; “Islamic-Arabism”; “Pan-Islamism”; or “Pan Arabism”
(Zeidan 1999). Each one of these views implies a different perspective of the Copts’ position in
the Egyptian society (Zeidan 1999). For example, when the liberal and Secular Arab identities
have been the dominant ideology, the Egyptian Copts could pursue equality, since it has been seen
as an authentic part of the Egyptian identity (Zeidan 1999). On the other hand, when the ArabIslamic and Pan-Islamic identities have prevailed, the Egyptian Copts were rusticated to a
subordinate status (Zeidan 1999).
Tensions and conflicts are typical in all societies with multiple communities (Zeidan 1999).
Despite the flexibility of religious and ethnic identities, that are continuously reestablished as soon
as the majority and minority conform to the changing contexts, religious variations do create
conflicts and constitute more impenetrable barriers than linguistic, tribal and ethnic differences
(Zeidan 1999). The period of Imperialism in the latter half of the twentieth century was the time
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when the existence of “the non-Muslim Arab communities” grew to become a significant political
issue (Tamura 1989). By that time, the imperialists took advantage of the various social and
cultural variations among the groups which they have conquered. They started charging hatred
among them by emphasizing the heterogeneousness of the society in order to foster social
fragmentation (Tamura 1989). From that time on, the issue of national unity has become one of
the most important social and political issues that countries have been facing (Tamura 1989). Some
theories have even implied that the historical origins of the issues of the minorities have roots in
political systems that are developed through the leading coercive force, or in other words, the
process of forming a “nation-state” (Tamura 1989).
According to (Tamura 1989), the era of British imperialism was the first stage of the MuslimCoptic conflicts in Egypt, where the Muslims’ attitudes towards the Copts were provoked and
triggered by the Danshaway incident in 1906. Such incident, for the first time in the Egyptian
history, created a conflict that was viewed as a serious political issue (Tamura 1989). The Second
stage of the Muslim-Coptic conflict was when a Muslim radical assassinated Boutros Ghali, the
Coptic Egyptian Prime Minister in 1910, in order to grant the British Empire the right to use the
Egyptian Suez Canal until 2008 (Tamura 1989). This incident has fueled a conflict between “Al
liwa” newspaper which defended the assassin and created an anti-Coptic campaign using offensive
discourse, and the Coptic newspaper, “Alwatan” (Tamura 1989). The apprehension of the Coptic
community has increased after the provocative campaign, urging them to dispatch representatives
to Britain to call for protection, and for equality with Muslims who are the majority in Egypt
(Tamura 1989). However, Sir Eldon Gorst investigated the issue and replied that the Muslims and
Copts have been living peacefully together, and that separating the Copts and treating them as a
“separate community” would make the situation worse (Tamura 1989). Such negligence from
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Britain, added to the feeling of the Copts’ isolation, forcing them to assemble an “All-Coptic
Congress” in 1911 where they gathered a total of 1158 Coptic representatives in “Assiut” to call
for The Copts’ equality with Muslims (Tamura 1989). The congress has resulted in mass protests
of both Muslims and Copts, as well as frequent riots and harassments at that time (Tamura 1989).
In response to the “All Coptic Congress”, the Muslims initiated an “All-Muslim Congress” in
Cairo, where they decided to deny the Copts’ demands (Tamura 1989). Although the relationship
between Muslims and Copts was deteriorating in 1911, it got better and stronger with the Egyptian
nationalist movement post the Second World War, where they endorsed the slogan of “Egypt for
Egyptians”, and all the complications of the Muslim-Coptic relations were immersed in the 1919
revolution (Tamura 1989).
The tension between the Muslims and Copts has risen again during President Sadat’s era,
which has ended up in Sadat’s assassination in 1981 (Tamura 1989). It has all started with the
incident of “El Khanka” village, where the Coptic Bible society’s village was set on fire by an
unknown person (Tamura 1989). Afterwards, the Church delegated priests to the village, and
organized mass protests to express their frustration (Tamura 1989). The Muslims’ response has
not stopped at organizing similar mass protests but they have also gone as far as destroying the
Copts’ houses and buildings in the “Khanka” village (Tamura 1989). As a result, the government
took advantage of the incident and interfered to take a measure, extending the presidential power
under the name of protecting Egypt’s national unity (Tamura 1989). Such interference, however,
did not stop Muslim radicals from burning various Coptic churches in Upper Egypt (Tamura 1989).
Thus, Pope Shunuda III intervened to take a series of actions, where he held a delegation for the
Coptic Church in Alexandria to inspect the situation (Tamura 1989). He also visited the USA for
meeting President “Carter”. Afterwards, he enforced a fast to express his protest while sending
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President Carter, Sadat and Vatican Pope to address the negligence of Copts’ human rights in
Egypt (Tamura 1989). The Pope has even called for cancelling the Copts’ official Easter
Ceremonies to express their discontent with the lack of Copts’ protection by the government
(Tamura 1989).
More Coptic Churches were burned in 1981 under Sadat’s rule, after the “Zawiyya Al
Hamra’s” riots in Cairo, which started with a fight between neighbors and extended to a huge
armed conflict between Muslims and Copts in the area (Tamura 1989). The Muslim radicals
continued bombing Coptic churches by that time, and that was when president Sadat intervened
and arrested 113 people from “anti-establishment elements” in order to restrain both Muslim and
Coptic radicals (Tamura 1989). He further exiled Pope Shunuda III to “Wadi Al Natrun”,
illustrating at the parliament that both Islam fundamentalists and Pope Shunuda represent threats
to the Egyptian unity (Tamura 1989).
There were hardly any changes in the Muslim-Coptic tension during Mubarak’s era
(Zeidan 1999). While there were negotiations with “the Islamic moderates”, aiming at eradicating
the radical extremists in Egypt; this, however, meant carrying on with the discriminatory acts and
maintaining the same status quo (Zeidan 1999). The Copts, thus, remained anxious after the
government’s violent repression of Islamists, and the disregard to the anti-Coptic attacks (Zeidan
1999). Zuhur and Tadros (2015) have further added that Mubarak’s government did not take any
measures to restrict the attacks against the Egyptian Copts or to ensure their security. Incidents
where the Copts were attacked or assaulted went unpunished, which lead to a massive increase in
the anti-Coptic attacks, with 37 attacks in 1992 alone (Zuhur and Tadros 2015).
While Mubarak’s regime was violently repressing the Muslim extremists of the “Gamaa
Islamiyya”, the government still attempted to Islamize the state. The media used Islamic rhetoric
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at that time, which provoked the Copts even more, especially when the famous religious figure
“Al sheikh Al Shaarawi” criticized and assaulted the Coptic beliefs (Zuhur and Tadros 2015). This
era has even witnessed the most prominent sectarian incident, “Al Kosheh” in 2000, which like all
other attacks, started with minor conflicts then developed with rumors spread all over the place,
causing an eruption (Zuhur and Tadros 2015). According to Rowe (2013), this violent sectarian
conflict has resulted in the death of at least 21 Copts.
There were also several alarming sectarian incidents preceding the 25th of January
revolution (Zuhur and Tadros 2015). For example, there was a shooting in 2010 which has killed
seven Copts (Zuhur and Tadros 2015). Moreover, in 2011, 23 Copts were killed in the Saint’s
Church in Alexandria on New Year’s Eve as a result of a car bomb (Zuhur and Tadros 2015).
Additionally, Rowe has (2013) illustrated that the attack stirred protests in “Shubra” districts in
Cairo, which made the precarious conditions of Christians in Egypt the highlight of global news
stories (Rowe 2013). Mubarak’s Government then condemned the attack, and announced that one
of Al-Qaeda affiliates, based in Gaza, has been responsible for the attack (Rowe 2013). Rowe
(2013) have further added that in March 2011 after the revolution, a Coptic church was destroyed
in southern districts of Cairo, leading to Coptic mass protests. This has been due to the fact that
the Copts realized that the armed forces were not effectively securing the Coptic places of worship
in Egypt (Rowe 2013). The same week has further witnessed the burning of a Coptic church in
“Imbaba”, by a group of Islamists associated with “Salafist” movement, resulting in the death of
at least 15 Copts (Rowe 2013).
While the Egyptian revolution has strengthened the bond between Muslims and Copts,
more Coptic churches were set on fire under Abdel Fattah Al Sisi’s regime. On 11 th December
2016, an explosion took place in the small church of St. Peter and St. Paul (El-Botroseya), killing
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at least 25 people, and injuring dozens of mostly Christian women and children while performing
their Sunday prayer (Hadeer El-Mahdawy in AlAhram online 2016). According to Ahmed Morsy
“The bombing was the deadliest attack on the Christian community, which makes up 10 per cent
of Egypt's population, since a 2011 bombing killed 23 worshippers outside Two Saints Church in
Alexandria” (Qtd. In AlAhram weekly). After the incident, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the Egyptian
President, declared a national mourning period of three days, where he called for hunting down
and punishing the criminals who were condemned for the attack (Cairo bombing: Cairo Coptic
Christian complex hit 2016 in BBC news middle east). While all hands were mostly pointed on
the Muslim Brotherhood, expecting them to be involved in the attack, since Morsi’s supporters
blamed Christians for overthrowing Morsi; the Muslim Brotherhood denied to be involved in the
attack (Ahmed Morsy 2016 in AlAhram weekly).
The state funerals for the attack was attended by the Egyptian President, who showed his
deep condolences for all Egyptians, and condemned “Mahmoud Shafik Mostafa” for blowing
himself up with an explosive belt upon entering the church (Ahmed Morsy 2016 in AlAhram
weekly). He also declared that “four others, three men and a woman, had been arrested in
connection with the blast and the police was searching for two more suspects” (Ahmed Morsy
2016 in AlAhram weekly). While on the other hand, two days after the attack, the Islamic state
(ISIS) claimed responsibility for the church bombing, identifying that the bomber was “Abu
Abdallah al-Masri”, yet the state failed to provide a clear explanation for such inconsistency (Nour
Youssef 2016 in “The New York times”).
There were also a series of simultaneous attacks against Egyptian Copts in 2017, where an
explosion took place at “Saint George” church in Tanta and “Saint Mark’s Cathedral” Church in
Alexandria. According to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), 27 Christian worshipers were killed
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and at least 78 were injured in Tanta, while in Alexandria, 17 Christian worshipers were killed,
and 48 were injured. President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi declared a three months state of emergency
right after the attacks, which was approved by the parliament (Africa Research Bulletin 2017).
According to Africa Research Bulletin (2017), the state of emergency was considered “the first of
its kind” since the new constitution adopted in 2014. President “Abdel Fattah Al Sisi” has also
announced that he would establish a higher council for fighting terrorism and extremism (Africa
Research Bulletin 2017).

2.5 The Egyptian Media and Anti-Coptic Attacks
The development of independent press, as well as the deregulation of the Egyptian press have
transformed the press coverage of Coptic issues and the conflicts between Muslims and Copts
from a public taboo to the most preferred subject of the weekly and daily press (Elsasser 2010).
Moreover, the discourse of Muslim-Coptic relations and Coptic issues has started to be dealt with
in a sensational manner, portraying the violent incidents against Copts as “a simplistic equation
between the extremists on both sides” (Elsasser 2010). Additionally, Elsasser (2010) has built on
the idea that the changes in the media environment has contributed to a greater public awareness
about the issues that the Copts face in Egypt. He has further noted that the increased media focus
on the mutual distrust between Muslims and Copts has contributed to an aggravation of an already
existent sectarian tension.
Such propositions were based on the analysis of one of the most controversial and widely
discussed sectarian incidents in 2008, “Abu Fana” monastery attack in Upper Egypt, where a group
of tribesmen carried firearms and attacked the Coptic Orthodox monastery (Elsasser 2010). They
destroyed the agricultural machinery in the land and burned the monks’ chapel and cells (Elsasser
2010). They also tortured and abducted four monks, in addition to abusing them physically and
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attacking their religious convictions by forcing them to spit on the cross and say the Islamic
“shahada” (Elsasser 2010). According to Elsasser (2010), such attack is an example of how a
simple crime, as well as mere conflicts over land and resources, can easily take the form of a
sectarian discourse, because the media always tend to frame them in “religious terms”.
In an attempt to examine the press coverage of anti-Coptic attacks, Elsasser (2010) has
analyzed the governmental and independent newspapers’ coverage of “Abu Fana” incident. In his
study, he has explained that governmental newspapers like al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Jumhuriyya
and al-Masaa; have not given the incident much attention. For example, Al-Ahram newspaper has
reported a short news story one day after the incident on the 29th page, entitling “Three people in
Al Minia” suffer gunshot wounds in an attack by gangsters (baltagiyya)” (Elsasser 2010). On the
next day, they have changed the headline to “one Muslim killed and four Copts injured because of
a conflict over land” (Elsasser 2010). Additionally, Al-jumhuriyya has reported on the front page
on the same day “prosecution begins investigation of Malawi incident”, while dedicating an
additional article inside the newspaper, highlighting the government’s efforts to alleviate the issue
(Elsasser 2010). Finally, Al- Masaa has reported “The governor of “Al Minia” during his meeting
with the people: what happened was a fight between two neighbors, the sons of Malawi are one
fabric” (Elsasser 2010). Nonetheless, news about the attack has suddenly disappeared from the
daily governmental newspapers three days after the incident (Elsasser 2010).
On the other hand, the independent newspapers have awarded the incident major attention,
highlighting the intensified tension in the Muslim-Coptic relations, as well as the government’s
failure to restrain it (Elsasser 2010). For example, Al-masry Elyoum and Al Dustor have focused
on portraying the Copts’ demonstrations against the government in “Minia” (Elsasser 2010). A
few days later, they have shifted the focus to the history of the incident, and to Pope Shenouda
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III’s reaction (Elsasser 2010). The “Abu Fana” incident remained the top priority of independent
newspapers’ headlines for more than a week, treating the incident as in issue of national importance
(Elsasser 2010). Later on, independent press has started to shift the focus gradually ten days after
the incident, until the issue disappeared in almost all the newspapers (Elsasser 2010). Unlike the
governmental newspapers, independent newspapers have carried out investigations on the issues
between the monks and Bedouins to know more about the history and background of the conflict.
They have also questioned the state security service’s and the police’s role in restraining violence
(Elsasser 2010). For example, a week after the incident, Al-Masry Elyoum has reported the
detailed history of the issue, with the various violent incidents that took place over the prior three
years (Elsasser 2010). Likewise, the independent newspaper “Ruz Al-Yusuf” has dedicated two
special reports to the incident, however, they were clearly biased towards the regime (Elsasser
2010). It is also worth noting that despite the fact that independent press has been trying to focus
on important aspects of the event, still it has been unable to unravel the contradictory information
made up by the various parties; and instead, conformed to the common version of state
representatives (Elsasser 2010).

2.6 The research objectives
This study aims to analyze the Egyptian press coverage of anti-Coptic terrorist attacks in
Egypt. The study also aims to investigate whether the media coverage of anti-Coptic attacks has
differed across the years and during different ruling periods. Furthermore, the study targets to
examine the relationship between the different media sourcing patterns and the coverage frames
of anti-Coptic attacks. To this end, the study will analyze the coverage of four different attacks:
the “Two Saints” Church attack in Alexandria in 2011, which was during Mubarak’s period; in
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addition to the “Coptic Cathedral” Church attack in Cairo 2016, the “Saint George” Church
attack in Tanta 2017, and finally the “Saint Mark” Church attack in Alexandria in 2017, under
President Sisi’s regime. The study, also aims at examining whether the coverage frames used in
governmental press differ from those in independent press. Therefore, the research will examine
one governmental newspaper “Al-Ahram”, and one independent newspaper “Al-Masry Al
Youm” using the quantitative content analysis approach.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 The Framing Theory
Various scholars have argued that the content of the media plays a significant role in shaping
the public’s perception of news events (Fahmy 2010). Yet, previous studies suggest that there is
still no common theoretical model for framing, and there are still operational differences among
scholars regarding the framing theory (Fahmy 2010). Moreover, various scholars consider framing
as a research program rather than a unified paradigm, which shows an overall unclear
conceptualization for framing (Fahmy 2010). In an attempt to operationalize the concept of
framing, Reese (2001) has offered a definition for the framing process by suggesting that ‘Frames
are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, which work
symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world.’ His definition has congregated the
ongoing active process of assigning meanings, which occurs within the framing process. It also
emphasizes the relationships within the context which may change by time (Fahmy 2010).
The general concept of framing was first introduced by Goffman (1974), where he suggested
that people develop frames in their minds to help make sense of what they view or hear in their
daily lives, a process that he referred to as the “schemata of interpretation”. Gitlin (1980), on the
other hand, has described framing from a journalistic point of view. He has argued that frames are
the tools facilitating the journalists’ organization and packaging of information to the audiences.
He has viewed frames as determined patterns of interpretation, selection, cognition, significance
and presentation that organize information for the audience as well as the journalists. Meanwhile,
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Entman (1993) has concluded that the process of framing involves the selection of some features
of perceived realities and making them more salient through the communication process to foster
a specific interpretation or judgment among the audiences. In other words, the process of framing
can have significant implications on how the audience perceive an event, since frames emphasize
certain features of reality and eliminate others; thus, suggesting different interpretations among
individuals (Borah 2011).
Various scholars have been interested in extensive tracking of communication frames in order
to determine the trends in defining certain issues, in addition to examining variations in issue
coverage across different media outlets (Chong and Druckman 2007). The reason why frames are
so important in the communication field pertains to the fact that such frames have a huge impact
on the attitudes and behaviors of their audiences (Chong and Druckman 2007). For example, the
communication frames used by the media are then adopted by citizens, social activists and even
politicians (Chong and Druckman 2007). Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) have further added that the
importance of framing is pertains to the fact that it has an impact on both the societal and the
individual levels. The individual level frame may lead to changing the audience’s attitude upon
the exposure to specific frames, while the societal level frames can influence complicated
processes like “political socialization and collective actions” (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012). It is,
therefore, essential to examine such context of the framing process, since most of the time
audiences have no direct experience with the significant events, and rely on the media to inform
them and provide them with the orientation about the events to be able to construct rational
judgments about them (Hamdy and Gomaa 2012).
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3.2 The Process of Framing in Communication
Framing is generally the process by which individuals construct or alter their interpretation of
an issue (El-Haddad 2013). In the context of communication, scholars have explained that frames
take place in the communicator’s mind; thus, influencing his decisions. They, also, take place in
the communicated text and in the mind of the receiver who might or might not conform to the
communicated frame (El-Haddad 2013).
The media framing model has divided the process of framing into four main aspects: frame
building, frame setting, individual level impacts of framing, and finally the societal level impacts
of framing (Scheufele 1999). Frame building pertains to the main elements that impact the basic
qualities of news frames (De Vreese 2005). Studies of frame building suggest that both internal
and external factors in journalism can affect how news organizations and journalists frame news
stories (De Vreese 2005). In other words, frame building refers to “the continuous interaction
between journalists and elites”, which results in the frames manifested in the news stories (De
Vreese 2005). On the other hand, frame setting pertains to the relationship between communication
frames and the audiences’ prior judgments and knowledge (De Vreese 2005). Previous studies
suggest that news frames influence the audience’s evaluation and interpretation of events and
issues (De Vreese 2005).
The consequences of communication frames can be analyzed from the individual level and
the societal level (De Vreese 2005). The individual level consequences refer to the certain attitudes
about an issue that have been changed upon exposure to certain frames, while the societal level
consequences refer to the creation of processes like “political socialization, decision-making, and
collective actions” (De Vreese 2005).
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3.3 Framing and Media Bias
The audience tend to interpret the main events based on the information that they receive
through frames, which in turn impacts how they react to such events (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003).
The news media frame such events through creating news stories which are the bi-products of not
only the journalists’ perception of reality, but also the competition in the journalism market over
attracting more audiences (Stout & Buddenbaum, 2003). The result of such “interrelated media
norms” is what scholars refer to as “unconscious framing bias” (El-Haddad 2013). The frames in
news stories are not caused by a counterplot against those who are negatively framed, but are rather
caused by the fundamental news values that regulate what is newsworthy and what is not, and that
determine how to frame issues; which sometimes result in a negative representation of certain
groups or issues (El-Haddad 2013). For example, Boykoff’s (2006) study of framing social
movements has concluded that news values such as personalization, drama, novelty, relying on
official sources, and fragmentation result in producing shallow frames for the social movements.
Entman (2010) has further clarified the basis of media bias. He has illustrated that there are
two relevant, but consolidated senses of the term: content bias, and decision making bias. Content
bias involves “consistently slanted framing of mediated communication that promotes the success
of a specific interest, party or ideology in competitions to control government power” (Entman
2010). Demonstrating slant patterns that often stimulate support for groups who pursue power, and
censure their opponents; refers to the existence of content bias (Entman 2010). The term “media
bias” should only be employed when scholars demonstrate the constant repetition of slant over
time in the most influential media outlets. This would consequently benefit interest groups in
“consistently persuading people to accept interpretations helpful to the favored actor for some
significant period” (Entman 2010). On the other hand, decision making bias refers to how
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journalists’ beliefs impact the texts and the frames they produce (Entman 2010). Various scholars
have explained that editors and journalists of different media outlets make their news decisions
based on their personal ideologies, while unconvincingly denying such bias (Entman 2010). ElHaddad (2013) has further added that “News slanting or content bias is the result of interaction
between the perceived facts, the media skills of each side in the conflict, the three different kinds
of decision biases, in addition to the event‘s context and audience schema”.

3.4 The Impact of Media Framing
Generally, there are two types of frames that are often identified in media framing effects
studies: generic frames and issue specific frames (Bos et.al 2015). Generic frames refer to the
common general patterns of journalistic reporting, while on the other hand, issue-specific frames
are those specifically designed for a particular event or issue (Bos et.al 2015). Basically, all
communication frames deliver a particular valence through proposing various arguments that are
with or against an event or an issue (Bos et.al 2015). Consequently, such valence provides
communication frame with the ability to impact both general attitudes and specific judgments
about an issue (Bos et.al 2015).
Research on media framing effects generally focus on the cognitive effects of framing,
which is how frames employed by the media can impact the audience’s underlying attitudes and
opinions (Bos et.al 2015). The previous literature on framing consider opinions as a sub-concept
and conceptualize it as changeable beliefs that incorporate judgments and evaluations about a
particular issue, whereas attitudes are considered more constant and general predispositions of an
individual about an issue (Bos et.al 2015). Scholars have also conducted a few studies on the
behavioral effects of framing in the media, where they mainly focused on the impact of media
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frames on political campaigns, voters’ turnout, and social movements (Bos et.al 2015). In these
studies, researchers concluded that media frames can promote protests and political mobilization
among individuals (Bos et.al 2015).
Various scholars have also been interested in examining how the framing effects work. For
example, Chong and Druckman (2007) have explained the difference between the moderating
variables of framing, and the mediating variables of framing. The moderators are variables like
individuals’ prior knowledge, individual values, credibility of the news source and the condition
effect of framing (Chong and Druckman, 2007). On the other hand, the mediators are mainly “the
psychological processes that mediate framing effects”, which are the availability, applicability and
accessibility of frames (Chong and Druckman, 2007). El-Haddad (2013) have further added that
there are other factors that moderate the effects of framing. In addition to individual values and
beliefs, the intensity and the strength of the frame, as well as the characteristics of competing
frames should be examined. Previous studies have suggested that both included and excluded
frames are important to understand the framing effects (El-Haddad 2013).

3.5 News Framing and Terrorist Attacks
In an attempt to apply framing to the context of terrorist attacks, Papacharissi and Oliveira
(2008) have argued that frames may be considered as a strategy for identifying the main cause and
responsibility of terrorist attacks, while also suggesting rational judgments and policy reactions to
them. That is to say, the frames that are used in the media to cover terrorist attacks, and those that
are used by the government to report and react to these events, have a significant impact on how
the society at large perceives the event (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). Furthermore, the frames
that are adopted in a particular society about terrorist attacks are able to contextually shape their
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definitions (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). For example, the thin line that differs between
freedom fighters and terrorists is often “blurred across political regimes” (Papacharissi and
Oliveira 2008). In other words, the actions of certain groups might be considered outrageous in a
particular society, while in another society it might be seen as an acceptable action (Papacharissi
and Oliveira 2008). Therefore, the way such strategies are framed has a significant impact on how
such acts are perceived among individuals of the society (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008).
According to Hamdy and Gomaa (2012), the Egyptian news media tend to select,
emphasize or exclude information, highlight certain features of one issue over the other, suggest
moral judgments, and finally provide suggested solutions. Hence, it is important to examine the
news frames adopted by Egyptian newspapers in the portrayal of anti-Coptic terrorist attacks, since
the press plays an essential role in the public’s perception about the issue.

3.6 The Different Types of Frames
Scholars have classified media frames into the following:
A) Individual frames and media frames
Individual frames are the frames in thought, which are constituted by the determinants of the
individual’s judgment; while media frames are communication frames, constituted by the
interpretation and the organization of information presented by the sender (El-Haddad 2013). The
media frames can be created by the government, the media, interest groups, politicians or even by
the audience themselves (El-Haddad 2013).
B) Thematic and episodic frames
Research on framing has identified the difference between thematic frames, or frames that
highlight the issue focusing on a broader context, and episodic frames, which focus on a specific
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issue or case. Iyengar (1991) illuminates that the general schemas of thematic frames help provide
insight for remarkable patterns of political communication and their impact on the attitudes of the
audience. For instance, audience who are exposed to news stories that episodically frame an issue
like poverty will more likely blame it on individual failure (Iyengar 1991). On the other hand,
those who are exposed to poverty news stories that are framed thematically will blame the issue
on the government failure (Iyengar 1991).
C) Generic frames and issue-specific frames
Media research has differentiated between generic frames and issue specific frames. Generic
frames are frames that go beyond thematic limitations, and can be recognized with relation to other
topics with different contexts; while issue-specific frames are frames that are only relevant to
certain specific events or topics (De Vreese 2012). The issue specific frames do not enable
researchers to generalize them to a set of issues or compare them across other issues, while generic
frames enable researchers to discover patterns in news coverage of events (El Haddad 2013).

3.7 The Sourcing Theory
Since journalists often rely on news sources for information needed for their news stories,
researchers have argued that sources have a great impact on the content of news stories. According
to Shoemaker and Reese (1996), the news sources are considered the “external suppliers of raw
material” needed in the news making process. Furthermore, leuven et. al (2015) have referred to
sourcing as the fundamental routine that journalists perform to access information, present various
points of view, and also double check their facts. Since journalists are not always able to witness
many events directly, they tend to rely on official and other mainstream sources in order to ensure
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credibility, objectivity as well as productivity (leuven et. al 2015). On that account, researchers
refer to sources as “the initial gate-keepers” of the gate-keeping process (Leuven et. al 2015).
As the initial gate-keepers, news sources have the ability to eliminate certain information and
choose which aspects to give the journalists at the end of the process (Leuven et. al 2015). Leuven
et. al (2015) have, further, explained that the information emphasized or deemphasized by the news
sources then have a direct impact on the way journalists report and present their news stories. In
other words, news sources can directly affect how journalists frame issues and events (Leuven et.
al 2015). Consequently, news sources “often become the news framers who offer or define themes
or symbols that help journalists to make sense of the environment” (Leuven et. al 2015).

3.8. The Use of Official and Elite Sources
Researchers have listed five main categories of sources used in the media. These categories
include: local government officials, international government officials, foreign private parties,
private citizens and vaguely identified sources (Bashri 2012). According to Bashri (2012), even
when the sources are vague or not identified, journalists can often replace them with one of the
other sources listed in the five categories.
Previous studies have found that journalists often rely on authoritative sources to cite them
in their news stories since they hold credentials among the public (Hermida et. al 2014). Such
credentials arise from powerful positions such as presidents, government officials, police officials,
or even powerful businessmen (Hermida et. al 2014). For instance, in the United States, researchers
have found that the news coverage is dominated by official and governmental sources, since they
are perceived to be more credible among the public (Kim and Jahng 2016). As a result, such

39

sources are granted an influential position in the news decisions and the news making process
(Kim and Jahng 2016).
A wide range of case studies have provided empirical evidence that the media output is
dominated and impacted by those who are in position of power. For example, when Iyengar and
Simon (1993) analyzed the news reports on the Gulf war, they found out that more than 50% of
the news stories have directly come from official spokespersons. Likewise, Manoff and Schudson
(1987) as well as Sigal (1973) have noted that more than three quarters of the news sources were
official institutions and government officials. Similarly, Wittebols (1996) has studied the US and
Canadian news coverage of social protest, and has noted that the reliance on official sources have
made the news coverage within a certain country in favor of the country’s government and policies.
Moreover, Kothari (2010) has examined framing Sudan’s Darfur conflict and has found out that
as journalists rely more on government official surces, the news stories seem to endorse their views
while deemphasizing alternative views.
Other studies have examined the news sourcing in terrorism related news. For example,
Palez et al. (1982) have examined the news sources employed by “The New York Times” in
terrorism related news in the 1970’s. The study has found that almost 69% of the news stories
included reports, quotations, or direct interviews from official sources, while only 21% of the news
stories attributed sources with opposing perspectives. A few years later, Atwater and Green (1988)
have carried out a content analysis to examine the news sources in television coverage of
international terrorism. Surprisingly, the study has found that the US official sources have been
given more time than non-US sources, even when the news was about terrorism outside USA. The
study has also shown that 70% of the news stories attributed official sources while only 30% of
the stories attributed other unofficial sources. Similarly, Wittebols (1995) has conducted a
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comparative study, examining the difference in the sourcing patterns of the US and Canadian TV
networks’ coverage of terrorism stories in the late 1980’s. The results of the study have shown that
60% of all the news sources in both countries were official sources, and they were even granted
longer segments than non-official sources.
There have also been studies that examined the sourcing patterns in USA and Arab
countries’ newspapers. For instance, Lee (2004) has noted that unlike the Arab newspapers, the
US newspapers relied more on sources that support their perspective regarding war on Iraq.
Moreover, when Kern (1979) analyzed NBC and CBS news coverage of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the results have shown that correspondents often quoted the US president, while
downplaying other sources of foreign opponents.
According to Matthews (2013), when journalists rely only on official sources, they risk
providing unbalanced news coverage of terrorist events. This does not only produce less quality
journalism, but also leads to the spread of fear and anxiety among the public about terrorism risks,
since government officials often tend to exaggerate and use more weighty terms in describing the
risks of terrorism. Moreover, Hickerson et. al (2011) have explained that even though reliance on
official sources might appear to journalists as a good journalistic practice that ensures credibility,
it might as well “come at the expense of other relevant voices that lack name recognition and
access to power”. In other words, when journalists rely more on official sources, journalists
provide a more abstract and compact version of what might be a concrete and diverse debate,
which will in turn impact the way the public is informed about the issue (Hickerson et. al 2011).
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3.9 The Relationship between Framing and Sourcing
The previous literature on sourcing and framing has provided an empirical evidence that
there is an association between the news source and the type of frame in news stories. According
to Stromback et. al (2013), “Who gets to speak in the news ultimately decides what audiences may
know from the news”. Consequently, there is indeed a relationship between the type of news
sources, the angle of the news story, and how the issue is framed (Stromback et. al 2013). So, the
loop goes on, the news sources impact the media frames, which in turn impact how the audience
perceive the issue or event (Stromback et. al 2013). Researchers have explained that the goal of
government officials is to be included in the news in order to influence the public through imposing
their preferred frames (Stromback et. al 2013). At the same time, the journalists prefer frames that
can grab the attention of the audience, and that are congruent with the public’s culture (Stromback
et. al 2013). On that account, frames can sometimes function as one of the criteria of news selection
and source selection (Stromback et. al 2013). That is to say, the news framing of events and issues
is a “coproduction” of attitudes and behavior of both news sources and journalists (Stromback et.
al 2013).
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between sourcing and framing. For
example, Peng Kee et. al (2012) have examined the role of news sources in the frame building
process using a content analysis of Malaysian and Chinese daily newspapers. The results of the
study have shown that the news sources have been more influential than the journalists themselves
in the frame building process. For instance, the study has found that stories attributing
governmental sources and “Barisan National” were more likely to use the attribution of
responsibility frame. Meanwhile, the human interest frame has been more dominant in stories that
attributed ordinary citizens.
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Similarly, Cozma and Kozman (2014) have studied the association between sourcing and
framing in the US’ elite newspaper coverage of the Syrian crisis. The findings of the study have
shown that stories that attributed US official sources, international official sources, experts and
other media sources have been more likely to use the conflict frame. The findings, also, suggest
that the attribution of responsibility frame has been more dominant in news stories that cited
president Obama and Syrian rebels, while the morality frame has only been dominant in stories
that cited Syrian citizens.
Another study has been conducted to test the relationship between framing and sourcing
concerning the US and South Korean news coverage of the nuclear test in North Korea. In their
study, Kim and Jahng (2015) have found that both the South Korean and the American newspapers
have differently employed their sources in a way that supports certain frames. For example, stories
that attributed US officials have been more likely to use security and economy frames. Meanwhile,
stories that attributed South Korean officials have been more likely to frame the nuclear test as a
strategy. Likewise, stories that attributed sources from other countries like China and Japan have
been more likely to use the diplomacy frame. The study has, thus, concluded that the use of news
sources in both newspapers have differed according to the frames chosen to impose certain
interpretations to the nuclear tests.
Bearing this in mind, it can be concluded that the process of framing in communication is
not static. It is rather a dynamic process that takes place at many levels, depending on both the
journalists themselves and their sources. In other words, the journalists along with their sources
work together on promoting frames that foster a desired interpretation of events.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
RQ1: What are the dominant frames incorporated by both newspapers in the press coverage of
the attacks?
RQ2: What is the major frame context in the press coverage of the attacks?
H1: The type of frame will differ according to the type of newspaper
H2: Official sources will be quoted more than other sources in both newspapers
H3: The type of frame in the news story will differ according to the type of source in each
newspaper
H4: The frames incorporated by both newspapers differ according to different governments
H5: The attribution of blame will differ according to different governments

4.2 Content Analysis
This study deploys the quantitative approach of content analysis to investigate the
Egyptian news’ framing of anti-Coptic attacks. The content analysis is a widely used research
approach that examines media content to describe the communication content, asses and evaluate
media messages, and compare them to the real world facts (Wimmer and Dominick 2011).
Researchers have come up with various definitions to the content analysis approach, among
which is Wimmer and Domick’s definition; which explains that content analysis is a “method of
studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for
the purpose of measuring variables” (2011).
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4.3 Defining the Universe
The study will be analyzing framing in one state-owned daily newspaper “Al Ahram”, and
one independent daily newspaper “Al Masry Al Youm”. The researcher has intended to include
both an independent and a state-owned newspaper in order to examine whether there will be a
significant difference in the way both newspapers frame the attacks. The researcher has also
refrained from including a partisan newspaper in the sample, as according to Atallah and Rizk
(2013), the partisan newspapers have been recently highly controlled by the state, and have become
“largely dictated by the interests of their respective affiliated parties”. “Al Ahram” has been chosen
to be the governmental newspaper analyzed as according to Egypt Today (2017), it is the most
selling state-owned newspaper. Similarly, according to the “Information and Decision Support
Center of the Egyptian Government – IDSC, 2013”, Al Ahram has the highest circulation of almost
190,000 copies daily. Elmasry (2011) have further explained that “Al Ahram” has been widely
seen as the “representative of state-owned newspapers”. Furthermore, “Al Masry Al Youm” has
been chosen to be the independent newspaper analyzed in the study as it enjoys high readership,
in addition to having the highest circulation among independent newspapers, with almost 160,000
copies daily (Information and Decision Support Center of the Egyptian Government – IDSC,
2013).

4.4 Sampling Method
The type of sample used in this study is a non-probability purposive sample. The purposive
sample is a type of non-random sample, whereby subjects who pertain certain qualities or
characteristics are selected to be part of the sample, and others who do not meet those
characteristics are eliminated (Wimmer & Dominick 2006). According to Miles and Huberman
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(1994:27), purposive samples are the most commonly used samples in applied research.
Researchers have also outlined various types of purposive samples but the most common
characteristic among all types is that “subjects are selected according to predetermined criteria
relevant to a particular research objective”. Therefore, the researcher has chosen to examine all the
news stories that mentioned the attacks in “Al Ahram” and “Al Masry El Youm” newspapers,
excluding the columns (opinion pieces written by a columnist in a side column of the newspaper),
and editorials. This is due to the fact that they tend to reflect the ideology of independent
individuals rather than the news agencies.
The researcher has also set a sample duration of one week after each attack, since according
to Jen-Shih et. al (2008), the media and the public usually do not focus on one specific issue for a
long period of time. They have drawn on this approach from Down’s “Issue Attention Cycle”
theory (1972), which referred to “the ups and downs of attention an issue receives either from the
public or from mass media”. The theory implies that an issue goes through some stages until the
public’s interest in the issue gradually declines, and then the issue gets replaced with another new
one of concern (Jen-Shih et. al, 2008). Thus, the researcher suggests that the first week after the
attack will be the week that receives the highest attention from both the media and the public. All
the examined news articles have been retrieved from the archives of both newspapers.
The study will analyze both newspapers’ coverage of the following attacks on the following dates:

 The “Two Saints” Church bombing in Alexandria, from 1st January till 8th January, 2011.
 The “Coptic Cathedral” Church bombing in Cairo, from 11th December till 18th December,
2016.

 The “Saint George” Church bombing in Tanta, from 9th April to 16th April, 2017.
 The “Saint Mark” Church bombing in Alexandria, from 9th April to 16th April, 2017
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The sample includes only one Attack that has occurred in 2011, during Mubarak’s era, since
this was considered the first attack on Coptic churches in Egypt by that time. Afterwards, the
Egyptian revolution took place, whereby Mubarak was ousted and Morsi came to power. Under
Morsi’s regime, no attacks have occurred against Coptic churches in Egypt. On the other hand,
when President Sisi came to power, more Coptic churches have been attacked on a regular basis.
This is why the sample includes three attacks that took place under Sisi’s regime, while only one
attack that took place under Mubarak’s regime.

4.5 The Unit of Analysis
Based on previous literature of framing terrorist attacks, the choice of the unit of analysis
in the study is the news story that is related to the anti-Coptic attacks in both newspapers, including
headlines and sub-headlines, and excluding photos. As mentioned by Papacharissi and Oliveira
(2008, p. 54), it is important to examine news frames incorporated in such news stories, since they
reflect the media’s ability to depict the reality of others, and to place more emphasis on a favored
interpretation and less emphasis on the less favored one. The headlines will, also, be examined, as
according to (Pan and Kosicki 1993), the most powerful framing device in the news story is the
headline.

4.6 Coding Categories and Operational Definitions
Since the results of content analysis can be easily influenced by the coder’s personal
perceptions and beliefs, the researcher has constructed operational definitions to each coding
category in order to ensure the objectivity of the study and to eliminate any coders’ bias.
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There have been standard variables in the beginning of the coding categories such as: the name of
the newspaper, the date, the story position (whether it is in the front page, inside page, or last
page), and the ruling regime by that time (whether it is President Mubarak or Sisi). Other categories
have been coded as follows:
Journalistic style: this category answers the question of which journalistic style is dominant in the
news story. Two journalistic styles have been derived from Falkheimer and Olsson’s (2014) study
of news framing of terrorist attacks in Norway. First, the descriptive style, where the coverage is
dominated by descriptions of what happened, or even reporting what someone has said about the
attack, all in a straight forward way, focusing on providing answers for what, when, who and
where. Second, the interpretative style, where the news story is dominated by providing an
explanation for why an attack has occurred, by providing evaluations and analysis. The journalist,
here, focuses on answering the “why” question instead of focusing on the classical journalistic
questions of what, where, who, and when.
The key issue: this category answers the question of which problem, or which main angle does the
story focus on. In case there is more than one key issue in a single news story, the coders choose
the most highlighted one to be the key issue. The researcher has drawn on Li’s (2003)
categorization of key issues and has added some key issues that might be relevant to the attacks,
constructing 9 main categories:
1. The attack itself: if the main issue in the story is to provide details about the attack and
how , when, where, and why it has happened
2. Victims of the attack: if the main focus of the news story is providing details about the
number of victims, whether dead or injured, how severe are the injuries are or even details
about their lives or their stories.
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3. The government’s reaction to the attack: if the story focuses on the government’s efforts
(including the military) to rescue the victims, adopting safety and security methods and
procedures, initiating investigations, announcing official statements or issuing notes of
condolences, or adopting new laws or policies.
4. The Egyptian public’s reaction towards the attack: if the main issue of the story is to
describe how the Egyptian community, whether Muslims or Christians, reacted to the
attacks, providing information of whether there have been any protests or movements
proceeding the attack.
5. The international community’s reaction towards the attack: if the main focus of the story
is to explain how other countries, foreign governments or foreign citizens reacted to the
attack.
6. The religious leaders’ reaction towards the attack: if the story focuses on how the church,
Al Azhar, or even priests and religious leaders have reacted to the attack.
7. Terrorism: if the story attempts to associate the attack with other terrorist attacks or with
terrorist groups; or if the story refers to the attack as an attempt to intimidate the citizens
or induce fear among the public in order to achieve a political goal (Ismail and Mishra
2009).
8. The Muslim-Coptic relations in Egypt: if the story mainly focuses on describing how the
relationship between Muslims and Copts have been going, whether improving or
deteriorating.
9. Other key issue: if the main issue of the story does not fall under the previous categories

Coverage frame: This category answers the question of which coverage frame dominated the news
story. For the purpose of this study, the researcher has used the definitions stated by Semetko and
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Valkenburg (2000), in addition to Falkheimer and Olsson’s definition of “war on terror” frame
(2015). To measure the extent of whether each frame appears in the news story, the researcher has
used a scale consisting of at least 3 questions for each frame; previously developed by Semetko
and Valkenburg (2000), whereby coders use yes/no to answer the questions. Afterwards, the mean
score for the questions will be calculated to examine the extent of whether each frame is present
in the news stories.
1. Conflict frame: such frame reflects the disagreement or conflicts between groups,
organizations, or individuals. The scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes
the following questions: (1) Does the story reflect disagreement between partiesindividuals-groups-countries? (2) Does one party-individual-group-country reproach one
another? (3)Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the attacks?
2. Human interest frame: such frame focuses on reflecting the emotional side, and bringing
the human face of the issue, therefore, stimulating the psychological pulse of the audience.
The scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes the following questions: (1)
Does the story provide a human example, or human face on the attacks? (2) Does the story
use adjectives or personal stories that generate feelings of sympathy, outrage, caring or
compassion? (3) Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the
attacks? (4) Does the story go into the private, personal lives of the actors? (5) Does the
story include visual information that might generate feelings of sympathy, outrage, caring
or compassion?
3. Attribution of responsibility frame: the frame by which the news story holds the
government, an individual, or a group responsible for the occurrence of the attacks, or for
providing solutions. The scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes the
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following questions: (1) Does the story suggest that some level of the government has the
ability to alleviate the attacks? (2) Does the story suggest that some level of the government
is responsible for the attacks? (3) Does the story suggest that an individual, or a group of
people is responsible for the attacks? (4) Does the story suggest solutions to the attacks?
4. Morality frame: such frame covers the attack in term of morals or religious context. It, also,
involves prescriptions of right or wrong, fairness or unfairness, guilt or innocence. The
scale used to measure the existence of this frame includes the following questions: (1) Does
the story contain any moral message? (2) Does the story make reference to morality, God,
and other religious tenets? (3) Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how
to behave?
5. Economic consequences frame: when the attack is covered in terms of the economic
consequences it will hold on groups, individuals, organizations or countries. Such
consequences include financial losses or gains, costs and expenses. The scale used to
measure the existence of this frame includes the following questions: (1) Is there a mention
of financial losses or gains now or in the future? (2) Is there a mention of the costs/degree
of expense involved? (3) Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not
pursuing a course of action?
6. War on terror frame: according to Falkheimer and Olsson (2015), such frame has emerged
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack in USA. This frame has the tendency to
link local conflicts to global ones (ex: ISIS, Al Qaeda…etc). It is applied by the media to
“justify and explain political and military strategies, especially when dealing with state
opponents” (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). The scale used to measure the existence of this
frame includes the following questions: (1) Does the story link the attack to terrorists with
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global reach (ISIS, Al Qaeda..etc)? (2) Does the story emphasize the fight against
terrorism? (3) Does the story call for special powers for wartime, or demand patriotic
allegiance?

Frame context: this category answers the question of what was the context of the coverage frame.
The coders here choose between the following categories based on Iyegnar’s (1991) classification
of frame contexts:
1. Thematic frame: if the news story presents the attack in a broader context, compare the
attack to other attacks, or refer to the attack as result of general tendencies or trends in the
society. Journalists also use the thematic frame when they try to explain the political,
cultural, social and economic consequences of the attack.
2. Episodic frame: if the news story is presented in a narrower context, focusing on a single
attack, victims or actions without going beyond that. In other words, if the journalists refer
to the attack as an individual issue with an individual solution rather than a societal issue
demanding societal reaction.
Sources: the coders have coded all the sources that the journalists referred to or quoted in the news
stories. The researcher referred to Zeng and Tahat’s (2012) categorization of sources:
1. National official source: any source that is appointed to an Egyptian governmental
position. For example: the president, government’s spokesperson, ministers, governors,
legislators…etc.
2. International official source: foreign governmental sources. For example: foreign
presidents, ambassadors, foreign ministers...etc.
3. Witnesses: individuals who have had direct contact with the attack, or have experienced it
personally including the victims who survived, their relatives, and also eye witnesses.
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4. Experts: individuals who are intensively knowledgeable about terrorism issues, economic
issues, and so forth. For example: terrorism scholars, security or military personnel,
Doctors, Professors, economists…etc.
5. Religious leaders: representatives of mosques and/or churches or any other religious
groups.
6. Terrorism perpetrators: groups or individuals who commit terrorist attacks. For example:
members of ISIS, Al Qaeda…etc.
7. People who are related to the perpetrator: for example his family, his neighbors, and so
forth.
8. Others: if the journalist has used a source that does not fit under the previous categories.
9. Not mentioned: if the source in the news story was not mentioned.
Blame placement: the researcher has developed the following categories to examine the attribution
of blame in the content of news stories:
1. The government: if the content include criticism of the government, its policy and/or its
security procedures, or if the content accuse the government for the attack, or for their
reaction to the attack.
2. Islamic groups: if the content condemns or blames Islamic groups in general, or a single
member of an Islamic group (such as the Muslim Brothers or Salafis or ISIS or Al Qaeda)
for the attack.
3. Terrorists: if the content incriminates specific or unknown terrorist who is not related to
an Islamic group.
4. Suicide bomber: if the news story condemns someone who carried out a suicide attack
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5. Foreign agents: if the content incriminates a foreign agent and holds it responsible for the
attack.
6. No blame placement: if the story does not specify to whom the attack has been attributed
7. Others: if the story condemns other individuals, or organizations for the attack.

4.7 Inter-coder reliability
According to Wimmer and Dominick (2014), it is essential to analyze a subsample of the
data analyzed in order to assume the inter-coder reliability coefficient. The subsample, as
mentioned by Wimmer and Dominick (2014) is between 10-25% of the whole study sample. The
following formula has been provided by Holsti (1969) to determine the percentage of agreement
between coders: “Reliability=2M/N1 + N2” (as cited in Wimmer, and Dominick, 2014, p. 175).
Since three coders have worked on the coding for this study, the three coders have coded 10% of
the whole sample and the results for each two coders have then been compared independently
using Holsti (1969) formula. Finally, the results for all coders have been summed and divided by
the number of coders. The results have shown an overall percentage of 97%, which is a high
percentage, meaning that the research results are reliable.
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Chapter 5: THE RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive Overview
A total of 553 news stories have been coded to test the research questions and hypothesis.
The researcher has computed the results using SPSS program, which is a statistical software
program that allows the researcher to describe the data and examine the relationship between
variables using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics.
Out of the total number of stories analyzed, 269 news stories (51%) have been coded
from Al Ahram, and 284 (49%) have been coded from Al Masry Elyoum. There have been 78
(14.1%) news stories that appeared on the front page, 467 stories (84.4%) that appeared on an
inside page, and 8 (1.4%) that appeared on the last page in both newspapers. Under Mubarak’s
rule, 316 (57.1%) news stories have been dedicated to only one attack, while on the other hand, a
total of 237 (42.9%) stories have been dedicated to three attacks in different periods under Sisi’s
regime. The major journalistic style in the news coverage has been the descriptive style,
dominating 540 (97.6%) of the news stories; while only 13 (2.4%) stories of the total sample
have used the interpretative style.
The majority of the stories coded have mainly been concerned by the government’s
reaction towards the attacks, which constituted 156 stories (28.2%); followed by both the
religious leaders’ reaction to the attacks, the international community’s reaction to the attacks,
and the Egyptian public’s reaction to the attacks; which constituted 61 and 60 and 59 stories
(11%) respectively. Furthermore, 58 (10%) of the news stories have focused on the victims of
the attacks, and 51 stories (10%) have focused on the Muslim-Coptic relations. Moreover, the
key issue of 37 stories (7%) has been terrorism, and finally 55 stories (10%) have been
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concerned with other issues like information about the perpetrators, the celebrities’ reaction to
the attacks, the media’s reaction to the attacks and even the rumors after the attacks.

5.2 Data Analysis
RQ1: What are the dominant frames incorporated by both newspapers in the press
coverage of the attacks?
To examine the extent of which each frame is present in the study, the researcher has observed
the overall mean score for each frame. The results are demonstrated in table 1.

Table 1 Test of mean differences between frames

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

Conflict
frame
.0663
553
.21240

Human
interest
.1537
553
.29689

Attribution of
responsibility
.1709
553
.20623

Morality
.3225
553
.39761

Economic
consequence
.0235
553
.11372

The results of the study suggest that the morality frame has been the most prominent in
the news coverage of anti-Coptic attacks, with M=0.322 (s.d=0.397), followed by the war on
terror frame M= 0.212 (s.d=0.367). The attribution of responsibility frame and the human
interest frame have been respectively the third and fourth most prominent frames with M=0.170
(s.d=0.206) and M=0.153 (s.d=0.296). Meanwhile, the conflict frame and the economic
consequence frame have been the least prominent frames with M=0.663 (s.d=0.212) and
M=0.235 (s.d=0.113).
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War on
terror
.2128
553
.36715

RQ2: What is the major frame context in the press coverage of the attacks?
In order to answer this research question, the researcher has looked into the overall frame context
in the press coverage of the attacks, the frame context in each newspaper, and the frame context
of each one of the attacks.

Figure 1 frame context overview

FRAME CONTEXT

Episodic
47%
Thematic
53%

Overall frame context: As shown in figure 1, the researcher has noted that 53% of the total
number of stories have used thematic frames, while 47% used Episodic frames.

The frame context in each newspaper: in order to examine whether the frame context differs in
each newspaper, the researcher has conducted a cross tabulation between the frame context and
the newspaper type. The results are demonstrated in figure 2.
57

Figure 2 Frame context * Newspaper cross tabulation bar chart

Frame context * Newspaper
35.00%
30.56%

28.75%

30.00%
25.00%

22.60%
18.06%

20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Thematic

Episodic
Al Ahram

El Masry Elyoum

As shown in figure 2, the results suggest that the frame context differs in the governmental
newspaper (Al Ahram) from the independent newspaper (Al Masry Elyoum). The major frame
context in Al Ahram has been the thematic frame, with 30.56% of the total, while the major frame
context in Al Masry Elyoum has been the episodic frame with 28.75% of the total.

Table 2. Chi square test results
Value
Pearson Chi-Square

df

19.633

1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000

1
1

.000
.000

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

a

Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

18.885
19.762

.000
19.597

1

.000

553
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.000

To test the statistical significance of the above findings, the researcher has conducted a chisquare test (shown in table 2). The results of the test, as shown in table 2, suggest that the results
2

are statistically significant X (1, N=553) = 19.63 and P <0.001

The frame context in each of the attacks:
Figure 3 frame context and the name of the attack cross tabulation

Frame context * the name of the attack
35.00%
30.00%
31.10%
25.00%
26.04%
20.00%
14.10%
15.00%
6.51%
3.62%
10.00%
3.62%
0.36%
11.75%
5.00%
0.36%
1.99%
0.00%
Thematic
Episodic

"The two saints" attack in Alexandria 2011

"The Coptic Cathedral" attack in Cairo 2016
"The Saint George" Attack in Tanta 2017
"The Saint Mark" attack in Alexandria 2017
Both "Saint George" and "Saint Mark" attacks in 2017

The results of the cross tabulation, as shown in figure3, suggest that the major frame
context in stories about “The Two Saints” attack in Alexandria 2011 was the episodic frame with
31.10%. Meanwhile, the major frame context in stories about “The Coptic Cathedral” attack in
Cairo 2016 was the thematic frame with 11.75%. The results have also shown that the major
frame context in stories about both “The Saint George” attack in Tanta 2017 and “The Saint
Mark attack” in Alexandria 2017 was the episodic frame with 3.62%.
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Table 3 Chi square test results
Value

Pearson Chi-Square

df

Asymp. Sig. (2sided)

78.148a

4

.000

85.355
6.553

4
1

.000
.010

Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

553

The researcher has also conducted a chi-square test to examine the statistical significance
of the above results. The chi-square test suggests that the results are statistically significant X

2

(4, N=553)= 78.148, and P <0.001
H1: The type of frame will differ according to the type of newspaper?

To test the hypothesis, the researcher has compared the means for each frame in each newspaper
and then conducted a t-test to examine the statistical significance for each frame in each
newspaper.
Table 4 Comparing frame means for each newspaper
Newspaper name

Conflict Human

Attribution

Morality

Economic

frame

of

frame

consequence terror

interest

responsibility
Al Ahram

Mean
N

Std. deviation
Al Masry
Elyoum

Mean
`N
Std. deviation

.0322

frame

War on
frame

.1517
269

.1348
269

.3705
269

.0285
269

.2590
269

.16224

.30452

.18123

.41959

.13357

.37579

.0986
284

.1556
284

.2051
284

.2770
284

.0188
284

.1690
284

.24681

.29000

.22234

.2770

269

60

.09101

.35389

Total

Mean
N
Std. deviation

.0663
553

.1537
553

.1709
553

.3225
553

.21240

.29689

.20623

.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715

The differences between means, as shown in table 4, suggest that the most prominent
frame in both Al Ahram and Al Masry El youm has been the morality frame with M= 0.3705 and
M= 0.2770 (s.d= 0.41959 and s.d= 0.2770). The second most prominent frame in Al Ahram has
been the war on terror frame with M= .2590 (s.d= 0.37579), while the second most prominent
frame in Al Masry Elyoum has been the attribution of responsibility frame with M= .2051 (s.d=
0.22234). The third most prominent frame in Al Ahram the human interest frame with M=
0.1517 (s.d= .30452), followed by the attribution of responsibility frame with M= 0.1348 (s.d=
0.18123) Meanwhile, the third most prominent frame in Al Masry Elyoum has been the war on
terror frame with M= 0.1690 (s.d= 0.35389), followed by the human interest frame with M=
0.1556 (s.d= 0.29000). Finally, the least prominent frame in both newspapers has been the
conflict frame with M= 0.0322 and M= 0.0986 (s.d= 0.16224 and 0.24681), followed by the
economic consequence frame with M= 0.0285 and M= 0.0188 (s.d= 0.13357 and .09101).
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Table 5 T-test of significance
Levene's Test for Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.
t
Conflict frame

54.520851

Equal variances not assumed

0.014106

Equal variances not assumed

6.435790

-3.688195

551

.000

-3.733199

494.862

.000

-0.399073

551

.690

-0.399

547.084

.690

.906

Equal variances assumed

Attribution of responsibility

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

Equal variances assumed

Human interest frame

df

.011

.000

Equal variances assumed

-3.992

551

Equal variances not assumed

-4.016

540.394

Morality frame

16.914628

.000

.005

Equal variances assumed

2.851849

551

Equal variances not assumed

2.840927

532.634

Economic consequence

4.317722

.038
1.022

551

Equal variances not assumed

1.010

466.310

20.176009

.000

.313

.003

Equal variances assumed

2.950

551

Equal variances not assumed

2.944

542.686

62

.005

.307

Equal variances assumed

War on terror

.000

.003

As for the T-test of statistical significance, the results shown in table 5 suggest that 4 out
of the 6 frames encounter statistical significance: the conflict frame t (494) = -3.733199 and P
<0.001, the attribution of responsibility frame t (540) = -4.016 and P <0.001, the morality frame t
(532) = 2.840927 P= 0.005, and the war on terror frame t (542) = 2.944 and P= 0.003.
Meanwhile, two frames have not encountered statistical significance in both newspapers: the
human interest frame t (551) = -0.399073 and P= 0.690, and the economic consequence frame t
(466) =1.010 and P=0.313

H2: Official sources will be quoted more than other sources in both newspapers
Figure 4. Sources overview

Not mentioned
People who are
7%
related to the
perpetrator
1%

Other
10%

National official
source
35%

Terrorism
perpetrator
1%

Religious leader
19%

Expert
10%

SOURCES

Witness
10%

International
official source
7%

The researcher has coded all attributed sources in each story using a multiple response
question. The most attributed source in the sample has been the national official source, observed
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in 35% of the total sample. The next has been the religious leaders, who are attributed in 19% of
the sample. The witnesses, experts and other sources like normal citizens, celebrities, university
professors, and so forth have been equally attributed in 10% of the sample. The international
official sources and the anonymous and unmentioned sources have also been equally attributed
in 7% of the total sample. The least attributed sources have been the terrorism perpetrators and
their relatives, constituting only 1% of the sample.

H3: The type of frame in the news story will differ according to the type of source in each
newspaper
In order to examine this hypothesis, the researcher has compared the means for frames in each
source, and then has used a t-test to examine the statistical significance of the most prominent
frame used by each source.
Frames used by national official sources
As demonstrated in table 6, the most common frame in stories that attribute national
official sources is the war on terror frame with M= 0.2734 (S.d= 0.43220).

Table 6. Test of frame differences for means used by national official sources
National official source
no

yes

Total

Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Mean
N
Std. Deviation

Human
Conflict frame
interest frame
.0626
325
.20915
.0716
228
.21730
.0663
553
.21240

.1951
325
.34062
.0947
228
.20686
.1537
553
.29689

Attribution of
responsibility
frame
.1385
325
.19949
.2171
228
.20728
.1709
553
.20623
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Morality
frame
.3682
325
.41510
.2573
228
.36228
.3225
553
.39761

Economic
War on terror
consequence
frame
frame
.0164
.1703
325
325
.10346
.30721
.0336
.2734
228
228
.12648
.43220
.0235
.2128
553
553
.11372
.36715

The results of the t-test for statistical significance suggest that this finding is statistically
significant, with t (382) = -3.096046 and P= 0.002
Frames used by international official sources
As shown in table 7, the most common frame used in stories that attribute international official
sources is the war on terror frame, with M= 0.4792 (S.d= 0.40625)

Table 7 Test of mean differences for frames used by international official sources
International official
source
no

yes

Total

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

Conflict
frame

Human
interest
frame

Attribution of
responsibility
frame

Morality
frame

Economic
consequence
frame

War on
terror
frame

.0713
505
.21968

.1675
505
.30689

.1832
505
.20920

.3248
505
.40025

.0238
505
.11447

.1875
505
.35333

.0139
48
.09623

.0083
48
.04039

.0417
48
.10735

.2986
48
.37182

.0208
48
.10666

.4792
48
.40625

.0663
553
.21240

.1537
553
.29689

.1709
553
.20623

.3225
553
.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715

The results of the t-test assume statistical significance for the use of war on terror frame
in stories that attribute international official sources with t (53) = -4.805025 and P<0.001
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Frames used by Witnesses
Table 8 Test of mean differences for frames used by witnesses
Witness

no

yes

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N

Total

Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

Conflict
frame

Attribution of
responsibility
frame
.1702
489

Morality
frame

.0661
489

Human
interest
frame
.0798
489

.3320
489

Economic
consequence
frame
.0252
489

War on
terror
frame
.2311
489

.21539

.18844

.20125

.40206

.11901

.37813

.0677

.7187

.1758

.2500

.0104

.0729

64

64

64

64

64

64

.18949

.36116

.24267

.35635

.05846

.22591

.0663

.1537

.1709

.3225

.0235

.2128

553

553

553

553

553

553

.21240

.29689

.20623

.39761

.11372

.36715

As shown in table 8 above, the most common frame used in stories that attribute
witnesses is the human interest frame, with M= 0.7187 (S.d= 0.36116). The results of the t-test
have further assumed statistical significance for the use of human interest frame in stories that
attribute witnesses with t (67) = -13.908664 and P<0.001

Frames used by experts
As demonstrated in table 9 below, the most common frame used by experts is the
morality frame with M= 0.0.3641 (S.d= 0.42379)
Table 9 Test of mean differences for frames used by experts
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Expert

no

yes

Tot
al

Conflict
frame
Mean
N
Std.
Deviati
on
Mean
N
Std.
Deviati
on
Mean
N
Std.
Deviati
on

Human
interest
frame

Attribution of
responsibility
frame

Morality
frame

Economic
consequence
frame

War on
terror
frame

.0642
488
.21033

.1656
488
.30888

.1655
488
.20617

.3169
488
.39412

.0205
488
.10482

.2172
488
.37634

.0821
65
.22845

.0646
65
.15854

.2115
65
.20363

.3641
65
.42379

.0462
65
.16538

.1795
65
.28914

.0663
553
.21240

.1537
553
.29689

.1709
553
.20623

.3225
553
.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715

The results of the t-test, however, have shown that the mean difference for the morality
frame in stories that attribute experts is not statistically significant, with t (551) = -0.898189 and
P= 0.369
Frames used by religious leaders
As shown in table 10 below, the most common frame used in stories that attribute
religious leaders is the morality frame with M= 0.6276 (S.d= 0.39379)

Table 10 Test of mean differences for frames used by religious leaders
Religious leader

no

yes

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean

Conflict
frame

Attribution of
responsibility
frame
.1794
425
.20751

Morality
frame

.0588
425
.19943

Human
interest
frame
.1755
425
.31855

.0911

.0813

.1426
67

.2306
425
.35043

Economic
consequence
frame
.0259
425
.12375

War on
terror
frame
.2094
425
.37452

.6276

.0156

.2240

Total

N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

128
.24999

128
.19350

128
.20011

128
.39379

128
.07073

128
.34268

.0663
553
.21240

.1537
553
.29689

.1709
553
.20623

.3225
553
.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715

The results of the t-test have further indicated statistical significance for the use of morality
frame by religious leaders with t (191) = -10.249485 and P<0.001
Frames used by terrorism perpetrators
As demonstrated in table 11 below, the most common frame in stories that attribute
terrorism perpetrators is the attribution of responsibility frame with M= 0.3333 (S.d= 0.25820)

Table 11 Test of mean differences for frames used by terrorism perpetrators
Terrorism
perpetrator

Conflict
frame

Mean
N

no

yes

Total

Attribution of
responsibility
frame
.1691
547

Morality
frame

.0670
547

Human
interest
frame
.1550
547

.3260
547

Economic
consequence
frame
.0238
547

War on
terror
frame
.2139
547

Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N

.21345

.29814

.20517

.39834

.11432

.36863

.0000
6
.00000

.0333
6
.08165

.3333
6
.25820

.0000
6
.00000

.0000
6
.00000

.1111
6
.17213

.0663
553

.1537
553

.1709
553

.3225
553

.0235
553

.2128
553

Std.
Deviation

.21240

.29689

.20623

.39761

.11372

.36715

The results of the t-test, however, have indicated that the use of attribution of
responsibility frame is statistically insignificant with t (551) = -1.944930 and P= 0.052
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Frames used by people who are related to terrorism perpetrators
As shown in table 12 below, the most common frame used in stories that attribute people
who are related to terrorism perpetrators is the human interest frame, with M= 0.3714
(S.d=0.29468)

Table 12 Test of mean differences for frames used by people who are related to the perpetrator
people who are related to
the perpetrator
no

yes

Total

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

Conflict
frame

Human
interest
frame

Attribution of
responsibility
frame

Morality
frame

Economic
consequence
frame

War on
terror
frame

.0659
546
.21209

.1509
546
.29468

.1703
546
.20670

.3260
546
.39871

.0238
546
.11442

.2143
546
.36831

.0952
7
.25198

.3714
7
.40708

.2143
7
.17252

.0476
7
.12599

.0000
7
.00000

.0952
7
.25198

.0663
553
.21240

.1537
553
.29689

.1709
553
.20623

.3225
553
.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715

The results of the t-test, however, assume that there is no statistical significance for the
use of human interest frame in stories that attribute people who are related to the perpetrator, t
(6)= -1.428397 and P=0.202
Frames used in stories with unmentioned sources
As shown in table 13 below, the most common frame used in stories with unmentioned or
anonymous sources is the human interest frame with M= 0.1510 (S.d= 0.27848)

Table 13 Test of mean differences for frames used by unmentioned sources
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Not mentioned

no

Conflict
frame

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

yes

Tot
al

Attribution of
responsibility
frame
.1746
504
.20918

Morality
frame

.0615
504
.20261

Human
interest
frame
.1540
504
.29888

.3433
504
.40227

Economic
consequence
frame
.0238
504
.11065

War on
terror
frame
.2235
504
.37521

.1156
49
.29306

.1510
49
.27848

.1327
49
.17003

.1088
49
.26691

.0204
49
.14286

.1020
49
.24724

.0663
553
.21240

.1537
553
.29689

.1709
553
.20623

.3225
553
.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715

The results of the t-test, however, assume that the difference between means is
statistically insignificant with t (551) = 0.066293 and P= 0.947
Frames used by other sources
As shown in table 14, the most common frame used in stories that attribute other sources
like ordinary citizens, celebrities, university professors, and so forth is the morality frame with
M= 0.3529 (S.d= 0.41880)
Table 14 Test of mean differences for frames used by other sources
Other sources

no

yes

Total

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N

Conflict
frame
.0625
485
.20660

Human
interest
frame
.1522
485
.30209

Attribution of
responsibility
frame
.1711
485
.20603

.0931
68
.25001

.1647
68
.25845

.0663
553

.1537
553
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Morality
frame

War on
terror frame

.3182
485
.39481

Economic
consequenc
e frame
.0254
485
.11947

.1691
68
.20913

.3529
68
.41880

.0098
68
.05674

.1225
68
.24369

.1709
553

.3225
553

.0235
553

.2128
553

.2254
485
.37975

Std.
Deviation

.21240

.29689

.20623

.39761

.11372

.36715

The results of the t-test, however, assume that the difference between means is
statistically insignificant, with t (551) = -0.674 and P= 0.500

. H4: The frames incorporated by both newspapers differ according to different
governments
To examine whether the frames differed according to different ruling regimes, the researcher has
observed the differences between mean scores according to different governments. The values
for each frame are elaborated in table 15. The results are then examined for their statistical
significance using a t-est.
Table 15 Comparing frame means for each government
The ruling regime

Mub
arak

Sisi

Total

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation
Mean
N
Std.
Deviation

Conflict
frame

Human
interest
frame

.0939
316
.24627

.1259
316
.27318

Attribution
of
responsibility
frame
.1574
316
.19905

.0295
237
.14898

.1907
237
.32272

.1888
237
.21454

.2714
237
.35244

.0253
237
.12009

.2785
237
.37241

.0663
553
.21240

.1537
553
.29689

.1709
553
.20623

.3225
553
.39761

.0235
553
.11372

.2128
553
.36715
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Morality
frame

Economic
consequenc
e frame

War on
terror
frame

.3608
316
.42491

.0222
316
.10887

.1635
316
.35584

The differences between means in the different ruling regimes, as shown in table 15,
suggest that the most prominent frame in Mubarak’s regime was the morality fame, with M=
0.3608 (S.d= 0.10887). Meanwhile the most prominent frame in Sisi’s regime was the war on
terror frame with M= 0.2785 (S.d= 0.37241). The second most prominent frame in Mubarak’s
regime was the war on terror frame with M= 0.1635 (S.d= 0.35584), followed by the attribution
of responsibility frame with M= 0.1574 (S.d= 0.19905). On the other hand, the second most
prominent frame in Sisi’s regime has been the morality frame with M= 0.2714 (S.d= 0.35244),
followed by the human interest frame with M= 0.1907 (S.d= 0.32272). The fourth most
prominent frame in Mubarak’s regime has been the human interest frame with M= 0.1259 (S.d=
0.27318), while the fourth most prominent frame in Sisi’s regime was the attribution of
responsibility frame with M= 0.1888 (S.d= 0.21454). The least prominent frames in both
Mubarak and Sisi’s regime were the conflict frame with M= 0.0939 and M= 0.0295 (S.d=
0.24627, and 0.14898) and the economic consequence frame with M= 0.0222 and M= 0.0253
(s.d= 0.10887, and 0.12009).
Table 16. T-test results for statistical significance

Conflict frame

Human interest frame

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.

t-test for Equality of Means

53.712

3.563

551

.000

3.808

.000

-2.551

529.22
0
551

-2.492

458.58

.013

12.125

72

.000

.001

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

.011

Attribution of
responsibility frame

Morality frame

Economic
consequence frame

War on terror frame

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

2.560

28.966

.415

18.819

.110

.000

.520

.000

-1.774

551

.077

-1.755

487.00

.080

2.628

551

.009

2.698

545.40

.007

-.324

551

.746

-.319

479.98

.750

-3.686

551

.000

-3.662

495.71

.000

The results of the t-test for statistical significance, as shown in table 16, suggest that there
has been a statistical significance for only 4 of the 6 frames: the conflict frame with t (529) =
3.808 P<0.001, the human interest frame with t (458) = -2.492 and P=0.013, the morality frame

t(545)= 2.698 and P=0.007 and the war on terror frame t(495)= -3.662 and P<0.001. Meanwhile,
the results for the attribution of responsibility frame and economic consequence frame have not
been statistically significant with t (551)= -1.774 P=0.077 and t(551)= -0.324 P=0.746

H5: The attribution of blame will differ according to different governments
To answer this question, the researcher has conducted a cross tabulation and a chi square test
between the independent variable (the ruling regime) and the dependent variable (the attribution
of blame). The results of the chi square test assume statistical significance in the relationship
2

between the ruling regime and the blame placement X (6, N=553) = 138.6 and P<0.001
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Table 17 Blame placement * The ruling regime Cross tabulation

Blame
placement

the government

Islamic groups

terrorists

suicide bomber

foreign agents

No blame
placement

Others

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
Count
Expected Count
% within The ruling
regime
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The ruling regime
Mubarak
Sisi
14
7
12.0
9.0
4.4%
3.0%
19
25.1
6.0%
11
48.0
3.5%
17
28.6
5.4%
59
33.7
18.7%
181
158.3
57.3%
15
10.3
4.7%
316
316.0
100.0%

25
18.9
10.5
%
73
36.0
30.8
%
33
21.4
13.9
%
0
25.3
0.0%

Total
21
21.0
3.8%
44
44.0
8.0%
84
84.0
15.2%
50
50.0
9.0%
59
59.0
10.7%

96
118.7
40.5
%
3
7.7
1.3%

277
277.0
50.1%

237
237.0
100.0
%

553
553.0
100.0%

18
18.0
3.3%

The results of the cross tabulation, as illustrated in table 17 above, suggest that the blame
placement under Mubarak’s regime was distributed as follows: No blame placement = 57%
(N=181), foreign agents =18.7% (N=59), Islamic groups= 6% (N=19), suicide bomber= 5.4%
(N= 17), others= 4.7% (N=15), the government =4.4% (N=14), terrorists=3.5% (N=11).
Meanwhile, the blame placement under Sisi’s regime is distributed as follows: No blame
placement= 40.5% (N= 96), terrorists =30.8% (N=73), suicide bomber=13.9% (N=33), Islamic
groups=10.5% (N=25), the government=3% (N=7), others=1.3% (N=3), and finally foreign
agents=0% (N=0).
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CHAPTER 6:
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION,
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter includes the research discussion, its conclusions, its limitations, and
recommendations for future research.

6. 1. Discussion
This study has been conducted to examine how Egyptian newspapers framed anti-Coptic
attacks in Egypt from 2011 till 2017, under two different ruling regimes, Mubarak and Sisi. The
study has employed a frame analysis of 6 frames, previously defined by Semetko and Valkenburg
(2000), and Falkheimer and Olsson (2015): the conflict frame, the human interest frame, the
attribution of responsibility frame, the morality frame, the economic consequences frame and the
war on terror frame. The sample for this study included one governmental newspaper (Al Ahram),
and one independent newspaper (Al Masry Elyoum). A content analysis has been conducted to
examine the coverage of 4 different attacks during one week after each attack: the “Two Saints”
Church bombing in Alexandria in January 2011, the “Coptic Cathedral” Church bombing in Cairo
in December 2016, the “Saint George” Church bombing in Tanta in April 2017, and finally the
“Saint Mark” Church bombing in Alexandria in April 2017
As part of the sampling process, the study has included an equal number of issues for each
newspaper. However, the coded content has been any article that referred to any of the attacks
previously mentioned. Interestingly, the number of stories in Al Ahram (N=268) was very close
to the number of stories in Al Masry El youm (N=285), giving a very close ratio of 49% to 51%.
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These findings have been different from Elsasser’s (2010), who examined the governmental and
independent newspapers’ coverage of Abu Fana incident, and has found that the governmental
newspapers barely awarded the attack any attention, while the independent newspapers gave it the
major attention. The research results, thus, suggest a shift in the agenda of governmental
newspapers, from concealing Coptic issues to exposing them.
The study has also looked into the journalistic style used in the news coverage of anti-Coptic
attacks. Previous research suggest an increased tendency for journalists to use the interpretative
style (Gulati et al., 2004; Neveu, 2002), whereby journalists shift from being observers to being
analysts and focus more on explaining why a certain event has occurred. However, the results of
the study have shown that the majority of the news coverage in both newspapers was descriptive
(98%, N=540). This has been similar to what Falkheimer and Olsson (2011) discovered in their
study of framing terrorist attacks in Norway, whereby they found that the press coverage of the
terrorist attacks in Norway has been dominated by the descriptive style. The reason why the
interpretative journalistic style is not so common in Egyptian journalism might pertain to the very
limited freedom of speech granted to Egyptian journalists.
The research has shown that both newspapers dedicated the highest percentage of coverage to
the government’s reaction to the attack (28.2%) N=156. During both ruling regimes, most of the
stories in both newspapers highlighted the government’s efforts to secure the churches, initiate
investigations, and to look after the victims. It is also worth noting that the governmental
newspaper (Al Ahram) used adjectives that directly praised the president and the government in
some of the stories, which calls their journalistic practice into question. The attempts to praise the
regime have sometimes even come at the expense of the accountability and credibility of “Al
Ahram”, when on January 4th 2011, a news story in the front page mentioned in the headline “the
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young sherry lost her mum and dad forever”, and then on the following day another story
mentioned that the governor decided to arrange a special exam committee for that girl in the
hospital, and in the same story they mentioned that the governor’s decision “got sherry’s mother,
who was with her in the hospital, very delighted”. The research has also noted that only the
independent newspaper conducted direct interviews with people related to the perpetrators, and
provided personal stories citing their families and neighbors. However, they were also clearly
biased towards the regime, similar the findings of Elsasser (2010).
News stories that were mainly concerned with the Muslim Coptic relations have been
dedicated a small percentage of the news coverage (10%) N=51. However, almost all of the stories
included either direct or indirect references to the relationship between Muslims and Copts. In
these stories, the press highlighted the strong basis of Muslim-Coptic relations and emphasized the
concept of national unity. They have portrayed the Muslims and Copts as “brothers” who share
the same land, live together and grieve together. They have, also, stressed on the idea that the
attacks have offended both Muslims and Christians and that the attacks were not secular, but rather
terrorist attacks. This supports what Iskander (2012) has previously explained, that “In most cases,
when an incident cannot be denied – for example, in the reporting during its immediate aftermath
– the emphasis of the discourse is on mitigating tensions by underlining the non-sectarian elements
of the dispute and reiterating statements of national unity”. Such finding, however, has been unlike
Elsasser’s (2010), who has found that the media focused more on highlighting the intensified
tension between Muslims and Christians. He has, further, noted that when the media focus on the
mutual distrust between Muslims and Christians and try to alleviate the issue using “religious
terms”, which actually leads to an aggravation of an already existing sectarian tension. His notion
might explain why the media has refrained from referring to the incidents as sectarian issues, and
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has focused more on portraying the good side of the Muslim Coptic relations. The research has
also noted that the era of Mubarak’s ruling regime was the one that included many stories
highlighting the Muslim Coptic relationships.
The study has examined the dominant frames that appeared in Al Ahram and Al Masry
Elyoum in their press coverage of the attacks, by comparing the mean scores of each frame in both
newspapers. The results of the study suggest that overall, the most dominant frame in the press
coverage of the anti-Coptic attacks is the morality frame (M= 0.322, s.d=0.397). In these news
articles, there has been a strong attempt to highlight that these attacks do not stem from an Islamic
ideology and that Islam is a religion of peace. They also stressed on the notion of national unity,
ensuring that the attacks have offended both Muslims and Christians and that there were also
Muslim citizens among the victims. The most common phrase noted among these articles has been
“terrorism has no religion”, which was stated more than once. Apparently, most of the news articles
used this approach since the Egyptian population is conservative in nature, and they often adhere
to the religious discourse; thus, the media tried to speak to them in a manner which they would
conform to. For example, various articles included phrases from the Quran and the Bible that
prohibit inciting violence and emphasize religious tolerance.
The findings of the study also suggest that the least dominant frame in the press coverage has
been the economic consequence frame, which is not surprising as the main focus has been to lessen
the mutual distrust between Muslims and Christians, disregarding the economic scene in Egypt. In
this approach, there have been very few articles that included statistics and data about the negative
implications of the attacks on the economy. However, surprisingly, there has been one news article
that claimed that the attacks did not have a negative impact on tourism, even though there have
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been other articles stating that countries such as the UK called off their flight to Egypt until further
notice.
The previous literature on media and terrorism suggest that the news media use both thematic
and episodic frames in covering terrorism issues (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). For example,
while examining the framing of the September 11 attacks in American networks, it has been found
that the coverage was dominated by episodic frames, disregarding the social and political
conditions (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). Meanwhile, there have been other scholars who
suggested that the media focus more on “global macro frames” when they report news about
conflicts and wars (Falkheimer and Olsson 2015). Similarly, the results of this study suggest that
overall, the major frame context in the press coverage of the attacks has been the thematic frame,
dominating 53% of the coverage. However, the episodic frame has been present in 47% of the
news stories, meaning that the percentage is somehow close and that the journalists used both
thematic and episodic frames in portraying the attacks.
The results of the study have further indicated that the frame context differed in the
governmental newspaper from the independent newspaper. In Al Ahram, the major frame context
has been the thematic frame, while the major frame context in Al Masry Elyoum has been the
episodic frame. These results have even encountered statistical significance. According to Iyengar
(1991), it is not only the attribution of responsibility frame that determines who the audience will
assign the blame to. The frame context, as well, directs the audience to who is responsible for the
problem. Therefore, the findings of the study were surprising, since the use of thematic frames by
the governmental newspaper (which is supposed to be the mouthpiece of the government) lies the
responsibility in the hands of entities, whether foreign, Islamic, or even the government itself.
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Meanwhile, the coverage in the independent newspaper which was mainly episodic, has shielded
the government from responsibility through providing “issue-specific” attribution of blame.
The research has further looked into the use of each frame in each newspaper, and examined
whether the frames differed based on the type of newspaper. The results of the study suggest that
the most prominent frame in Al Ahram and Al Masry Elyoum is the same, which is the morality
frame (M= 0.3705, s.d=0.41959 and M= 0.2770, s.d= 0.2770). Both newspapers referred to phrases
from the holy Quran to condemn the attacks. For example “Al Masry Elyoum” on 2nd Januray
2011, published in the headline on the front page, the day that followed the attack was “as if he
killed everyone”, which is a phrase from the holy Quran that condemns anyone who kills innocent
souls. Likewise, in “Al Ahram”, a story mentioned in the headline on 6 th January 2011, “All
Muslims must protect the churches, and this is an order clearly stated in Quran”.
The human interest frame has been almost equally used by both newspapers, whereby the
news articles have emphasized the huge impact of the attacks on the personal lives of the victims,
in order to invoke sympathy by the readers. For instance, on the 12th of April 2017, a news story
in Al Masry Elyoum mentioned in its headline “the wife of Medhat Moussa, one of the victims,
said: “my husband returned with me as a piece of meat”. Similarly powerful quotes have also been
used by Al Ahram. For instance, on the 3rd of January 2011, a news article had in its headline
“Mina was ready to get married, before he was killed and his fiancé was severely injured by the
hands of terrorists”. It is also worth noting that the human interest frame has sometimes been used
by both newspapers with a twist of focus on victims of the police, who have been killed in their
duties to protect the churches. This approach has been used to invoke sympathy with the police
members in order to conceal the gaps in security.
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The results have also indicated that both newspapers showed minimal use of the conflict frame
and the economic consequences frame. The minimal use of the conflict frame in both newspapers
was shocking, given the fact that after each attack, there were several protests that resulted in
disputes between the citizens and the police. Some have even resulted in conflicts between
Muslims and Christians. Surprisingly, Al Masry Elyoum mentioned in the headline of a story
published on January 4th 2011, “The angry protests after the attack in Alexandria have set out a
record, with 6 organized protests in Cairo”. The use of the phrase “set out a record” was in fact
interesting, since the attack by that time has occurred right before the Egyptian revolution.
The minimal use of the economic consequence frame has been also alarming. Even so when
“Al Ahram” has used the economic consequence frame, the news stories elaborated that the
Egyptian economy overcame the negative implications of the attack on the economy, when on the
3rd of January 2011, Al Ahram mentioned in the headline “the stock market overcomes the attack
in Alexandria, with an increase in the price of 138 shares and an increase in foreign investments”.
On the other hand, when Al Masry Elyoum used the economic consequence frame, they have
actually referred to the negative economic implications of the attacks. For instance, a news article
on April 10th 2017 mentioned in the headline “the stock market loses 7 billion pounds after the
attacks on churches”.
Other frames have fared differently across newspapers. For example, “Al Masry Elyoum” has
used the attribution of responsibility frame more than “Al Ahram”. Nevertheless, the responsibility
has not been pointed towards the government except for once on 6th January 2011, when a news
story mentioned that the American secretary of international affairs said that the government did
not take any measures to stop repression and discrimination against Christians in Egypt, and failed
to punish those who have been responsible for violence and religious intolerance.
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Moreover, the war on terror frame has been used more by “Al Ahram”, whereby the attacks
have been mostly linked to terrorists with global reach like “Al Qaeda” or “ISIS”, and the demand
for patriotic allegiances to fight terrorism has been emphasized. It is also worth mentioning that
the war on terror frame has been sometimes used to instill fear in the minds of the readers that such
attacks are an attempt by terrorists to make Egypt like Iraq (when Mubarak was in power), or Syria
(When Sisi was in power). This analogy is actually interesting, since the deterioration in Iraq and
Syria would definitely invoke fear in the minds of the readers, thinking if they oppose the regime,
the situation in Egypt will get worse.
Although there have been differences in the mean score for some frames in each newspaper,
only 4 out of the 6 frames have shown statistical significance: the conflict frame, the attribution of
responsibility frame, the morality frame, and the war on terror frame. The economic consequence
frame and the human interest frame, however, have not encountered statistical significance. This
might suggest that both newspapers have used these frames in the same manner.
The research has, also, examined the diversity of sources in the press coverage of the attacks.
The results have illustrated that the official sources, whether local or international ones, constituted
54% of the coverage. Cozma and Kozman (2014) have previously explained that the journalists
tend to rely more on official sources because they are more authoritative, so they are perceived as
the most credible among the public. They have further explained that their reliance on official
sources is sometimes due to the time and space constrains. The research findings have been similar
to Manoff and Schudson ‘s(1987) as well as Sigal’s (1973), who found out that more than three
quarters of the news sources were official institutions and government officials. The findings have,
also, been similar to Wittebols’ (1996), Palez et.al’s (1982), Atwater and Green’s (1988), and
Kothari’s (2010), who found that official sources dominated coverage of terrorism news.
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The study has also examined the effect of news sources on the frames used in the coverage of
the attacks. The results suggest that the most common frame in stories that attribute official
sources, whether national or international, was the war on terror frame (M= 0.2734, S.d= 0.43220),
(M= 0.4792 S.d= 0.40625). The results have even assumed statistical significance, t (382) = 3.096046, P= 0.002, and t (53) = -4.805025, P<0.001. These results differ from that of Peng Kee
et. al’s (2012), which suggested that stories attributing official sources rely more on the attribution
of responsibility frame. The research findings also suggest that the most common frame in stories
that attribute witnesses is the human interest frame (M= 0.7187, S.d= 0.36116). The results have
even encountered statistical significance with t (67) = -13.908664 and P<0.001. These results are
similar to that of Peng Kee et. al’s (2012), who illustrated that stories attributing ordinary citizens
relied more on human interest frame.
The study has also found that the most common frame in stories that attribute experts is the
morality frame (M= 0.0.3641, S.d= 0.42379). However, these results did not encounter statistical
significance with t (551) = -0.898189 and P= 0.369. This might be because all of the stories that
attributed experts included other sources as well, so the morality frame might have been relevant
to the other sources in the story. The study has further found that the most common frame in stories
that attribute religious leaders is the morality frame (M= 0.6276, S.d= 0.39379) and the results
have further assumed statistical significance with t (191) = -10.249485 and P<0.001. Such finding
has not been surprising, since religious leaders often tend to explain the problem in a religious
context. Surprisingly, the results have shown that the most common frame used by terrorism
perpetrators is the attribution of responsibility frame (M= 0.3333, S.d= 0.25820). These results,
however, have been statistically insignificant with t (551) = -1.944930 and P= 0.052. Furthermore,
the most common frame in stories that attribute people who are related to the perpetrator is the
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human interest frame (M= 0.3714, S.d=0.29468). The results have been, however, statistically
insignificant with t (6)= -1.428397 and P=0.202. The findings, also, suggest that the most
common frame in stories with anonymous or unmentioned sources is the human interest frame
(M= 0.1510, S.d= 0.27848). However, they have been statistically insignificant with t (551) =
0.066293 and P= 0.947. Finally, the findings suggest that the most common frame in stories that
attribute other sources like celebrities, ordinary citizens, university professors, and so forth, is the
morality frame (M= 0.3529, S.d= 0.41880). However, these results have been statistically
insignificant with t (551) = -0.674 and P= 0.500. The most logical explanation for frames that have
not encountered statistical significance might be the fact that such stories included other sources
as well that employed these frames.
There has also been an attempt to discover whether frames differed according to different
ruling regimes. During Mubarak’s era, the most common frame was morality frame with (M=
0.3608, S.d= 0.10887). The second most common frame was the war on terror frame, followed by
the attribution of responsibility frame, the human interest frame, the conflict frame and the
economic consequences frame. Meanwhile, the most common frame in Sisi’s era has been the war
on terror frame (M= 0.2785, S.d= 0.37241). The second most common frame during Sisi’s regime
was the morality frame, followed by the human interest frame, the attribution of responsibility
frame, the conflict frame and the economic consequences frame. On the other hand, only 4 of the
6 frames have encountered statistical significance: the conflict frame, the human interest frame,
the morality frame, and the war on terror frame. Meanwhile, the use of responsibility frame and
the economic consequence frame has been statistically insignificant. This might suggest that the
use of these frames have not differed based on different ruling regimes.
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The reason why frames in Mubarak’s regime have differed from Sisi’s regime might be due
to the fact that when Mubarak was in power, he was somehow unchallenged. The main focus of
his administration has been to maintain power and the current status quo. The attacks against
Copts, at that time, have been viewed as a threat to that status quo. They feared the Copts may
respond aggressively, which might lead to a chain of events that would result in violence which
would disrupt his power. That is why the media has always focused on the idea that Muslims and
Copts share the same land and portrayed it in moral terms in order to calm the increasingly Coptic
rage. Meanwhile, when Sisi has come into power, the main premise of his campaign has been
empowering national unity to defeat terrorism. This explains that the ruling regime indirectly
influences the media discourse to the favor of whoever is in power.
The study has, also, aimed to examine whether the attribution of blame differed according to
different ruling regimes. The results suggest that the highest percentage (57%-40%) of news stories
during both Mubarak and Sisi’s regime has not included any blame placement. However, the
second most common blame placement during Mubarak’s regime was on foreign agents (19%).
This might be due to the fact that Mubarak did not want to rile up the Christian population by
blaming the attacks on Muslim extremists. Moreover, he did not want to lose the large Muslim
population by blaming Islamic groups, so it was always easier to blame foreign agents who were
often perceived by the Egyptians as enemies. Meanwhile, During Sisi’s rule, the second most
common blame placement has been on terrorists (31%), which further supports his premise of
defeating terrorism. It is, also, worth noting that during both ruling regimes a very few percentage
blamed the government for the attacks (3% and 4%), which has not been surprising, given the fact
that all of the news stories seemed to praise the government and their efforts to secure Egyptian
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Copts. Finally, the results have assumed statistical significance in the relationship between the
2

blame placement and the ruling regime: X (6, N=553) = 138.6 and P<0.001.
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6.2 Conclusion
This study is set out to examine how governmental and independent newspapers framed the
anti-Coptic attacks in Egypt in the period between 2011 and 2017. A quantitative content
analysis of 553 news articles, published in “Al Ahram” and “Al Masry Elyoum”, has been
conducted in order to categorize the frames used in the news coverage of the attacks. More
specifically, the study has looked to provide answers to the following notions: what are the
dominant frames in the news coverage of anti-Coptic attacks?, how did the frames differ
according to the type of newspaper (whether governmental or independent) and the ruling
regime?, what is the frame context used by both newspaper?, what are the dominant sources used
in the news coverage of anti-Coptic attacks?, how did the sources affect the type of frame?, and
finally whether the attribution of blame will differ according to different ruling governments.
The study has concluded that both the governmental and the independent newspapers have
relied mostly on the morality frame in an attempt to heal the unrest between Muslims and
Christians, by ensuring that Muslims cannot be condemned for the attacks and that terrorism has
no religion. It is also worth noting that both newspapers have totally neglected the negative
implications that the attacks held on the economy, since the economic consequences frame has
been barely used.
The research has also shown that the overall frame context in the press coverage of the antiCoptic attacks has been the thematic frame. However, the ratio between the use of thematic frame
and the use of episodic frame has not been very high, meaning that they used both thematic and
episodic frames to an equal extent. The study has further indicated a difference in the frame context
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between the governmental newspaper and the independent one, whereby the governmental
newspaper relied more on thematic frames, while the independent one relied more on episodic
frames.
The study has also found that the use of some frames have differed across both newspapers,
while other frames have almost been used equally. For example, the use of morality frame has not
differed according to the type of newspaper. It has been the most dominant frame in both “Al
Ahram” and “Al Masry Elyoum”. Similarly, the use of the conflict frame and the economic
consequences frame have not differed across both newspapers, since they have been the least used
frames. Both the governmental and the independent newspapers have not given much attention to
the conflicts caused by the mass protests that followed each attack, or the negative economic
implications of the attacks. This reflects that although the journalists carry on their shoulders the
responsibility to inform the audience with all the possible sides and consequences of an issue, they
are still emphasizing only whatever relieves the public in order to ensure the stability of the status
quo.
Meanwhile, there have been other frames used by the independent newspaper more than the
governmental one. For example, the attribution of responsibility frame, which has been granted
more space in the independent newspaper. The increased use of responsibility frame by the
independent newspaper, however, has not pointed out the responsibility to the government.
Instead, they have dropped out responsibility from the government to either foreign agents when
Mubarak was in power, or terrorists when Sisi was in power. This suggests that although the
independent press does not commit the pitfalls of the governmental press (directly praising the
government), the journalists of the independent press are still loyal to the government, and they
still conceal its failures. There have also been other frames that were used more by the
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governmental newspaper. For example, the war on terror frame, whereby journalists linked the
attacks to terrorists with global reach like Al Qaeda under Mubarak’s regime, and ISIS under Sisi’s
regime. The use of this frame often emphasized the necessity of fighting terrorism whatever the
costs are, and the demand for patriotic allegiances, as well as the need for special power for war
against terrorism.
The study has also looked into the use of different sources in the press coverage of the attacks.
The results suggest that the most attributed sources in the press coverage of anti-Coptic attacks
have been official sources, both local and international. This actually supports the previous
findings of Sigal (1973), Palez et. al (1982), Manoff and Schudson (1987), Atwater and Green
(1988), Wittebol (1996), and Kothari (2010). Although official sources are perceived among the
public as sources with high credibility, the increased use of official sources comes at the expense
of others who also need to have their voice heard. Journalists must give more attention to other
sources like ordinary citizens or experts, who have been clearly under-represented in news about
the attacks. For example, if journalists took the time to interview more terrorism experts, they
would have provided the public with valuable information and interpretations about why the
attacks against Copts have been recently increasing, what should the public do to avoid these
attacks, and who should be held responsible. Economic experts would have also been beneficial
sources for explaining the economic implications of such tensions, and providing accountable
solutions for whatever negative implications these attacks hold.
The effects of attributed sources on the frames in each news story have also been examined in
the study. The results suggest that some sources do have an impact on the frames used. For
example, stories with official sources were more likely to use the war on terror frame. Also the

90

human interest frame was more present in stories that attribute witnesses. Meanwhile, the morality
frame was more present in stories that attribute religious leaders.
The difference in frames used throughout different ruling regimes has also been apparent in
the study. During Mubarak’s era, the most common frame used has been the morality frame. This
might pertain to the fact that Mubarak always saw that he was unchallenged. However, he has
finally realized that the attacks against Copts jeopardize his power and the current status quo. This
is why he wanted to stabilize the situation by choosing the way that Egyptians would mostly adhere
to without any doubts or questioning, which is the religious discourse. On the other hand, the most
common frame under Sisi’s regime has been the war on terror frame. This might pertain to the fact
that Sisi has gained a huge support from the Egyptian Copts when he came into power. To maintain
this support, his main premise has been the promotion of national unity and equality between
Muslims and Christians to fight terrorism threats. The difference of frames during different ruling
periods reflect that the discourse of both the governmental and the Egyptian press are directly
influenced by the ruling regime to the favor of whoever is in power.
The study has also examined whether the blame placement differ during different ruling
regimes. The results of the study have indicated that during both Mubarak’s and Sisi’s regimes,
the highest percentage of news coverage have not included any blame placement. However, the
second most common attribution of blame differed across different governments. For example,
under Mubarak’s rule, the news stories blamed the attack on foreign agents who have been
perceived as the country’s enemies. On the other hand, under Sisi’s rule, the attacks have been
blamed on terrorists who felt threatened by the success of Sisi’s administration.
Overall, the author has observed the following trends in the Egyptian media’s coverage of antiCoptic attacks:
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The political bias of both governmental and independent newspapers: The portrayal of antiCoptic attacks in both the governmental and independent outlets usually reflected the state
officials’ perspective instead of the peoples’ perspectives. Both outlets have failed to
address the security gaps and the deterioration in protecting the rights of minorities in
Egypt. There has barely been any criticism to the state, the police or the military’s response
to the attacks; instead, they have often been praised for their great efforts in securing the
churches and saving the lives of the victims.



The concealment of the reality of violence against Coptic Christians, and the propagation
of conspiracy: the attacks have been frequently portrayed in both media outlets as unusual
events committed either by outsiders who are perceived as the Egyptians’ enemies, or by
those who want to destabilize the country’s current status quo. It has been obvious that the
Egyptian press has refrained from reflecting the broad societal division in Egypt.



Externalizing the blame: It has been obvious that the anti-Coptic attacks have been framed
in terms of the national unity among Muslims and Christians, with foreign agents, or hostile
terrorist groups identified as the perpetrators who seek the disturbance of such national
unity. This can actually reflect the tendency of the Egyptian press to redirect away the focus
from the secular tensions and also from the role of the government and its policies in
promoting violence against Egyptian Copts.

Clearly, the media tend to have an important role in the development of the country’s future,
especially in times of crisis like the sectarian violence in Egypt. Whether these contributions are
negative or positive depends on several factors like the extent of freedom of speech as well as the
journalists’ commitment to objectivity and social responsibility. Therefore, the journalists must
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refrain from providing biased, or misleading coverage in order to conceal some failure and gaps
of the governments’ efforts to secure the Egyptian Copts.

6.3 Limitations
One of the limitations for this study is that the results are only relevant to the content type and
the time frame chosen in the sampling process. The researcher has also been unable to include
more newspapers to the sample chosen. Therefore the results cannot be generalized beyond this
scope. Moreover, the researcher has looked only into news articles, hence, the results cannot be
applied to opinion articles. The results have also been limited to the content of newspapers,
disregarding any other media outlet that might be effective as well. Furthermore, the research has
been limited to describing the frames in the communication content. Therefore, other relevant
research methods might be considered to test the effects of such frames on the audience.

6.4 Recommendations for Future Research
Future research should address the difference between the print media and the new media in
framing anti-Coptic attacks, as the social media is becoming more influential. It is also suggested
to use the findings of the present study as preliminary data for further research that tackle the
effects of framing anti-Coptic attacks on the audience’s perception of the government’s
performance, as well as Muslim Coptic relations in Egypt.
It might also be beneficial to compare between framing anti-Coptic attacks in the Egyptian
media and the international media, since the international media would be less biased towards the
regime. Finally, further research should provide more insights and in-depth information on how
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news sources affect frame building. This could be done by using qualitative methods like in-depth
interviews with Egyptian journalists.
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CHAPTER 8: APPENDICES
Appendix (A): The Code Book


Coder ID:

1= Esraa, 2= Nihal, 3= Sarah


Newspaper name:

1= Al Ahram, 2= Al Masry Elyoum


Date: mm/dd/yyy



Story position:

1= front page, 2= inside page, 3= last page


The name of the attack

1= The "Two Saints" attack in Alexandria
2= The "Coptic Cathedral" attack in Cairo
3= The "Saint George" attack in Tanta
4= The "Saint Mark" attack in Alexandria
5= Both "Saint George" and "Saint Mark" attacks


The title of text:



The ruling regime:

1= Mubarak, 2= Sisi
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Journalistic style:

1= descriptive style, 2= Interpretative style


What is the key issue of the news story?

1= The attack itself
2= Victims of the attack
3= The government's reaction to the attack
4= The Egyptian public's reaction to the attack
5= The international community's reaction to the attack
6= The religious leaders' reaction to the attack
7= Terrorism
8= The Muslim Coptic relations in Egypt
9= Others (If you choose other, please specify)


Please, answer the following questions and fill out the code sheet

YES=1 NO=0


Conflict frame

1. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties-individuals-groups-countries?
2. Does one party-individual-group-country reproach another?
3. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the attacks?


Human interest frame
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1. Does the story provide a human example, or human face on the attacks?
2. Does the story use adjectives or personal stories that generate feelings of sympathy,
outrage, caring or compassion?
3. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the attacks?
4. Does the story go into the private, personal lives of the actors?
5. Does the story include visual information that might generate feelings of sympathy,
outrage, caring or compassion?


Attribution of responsibility frame

1. Does the story suggest that some level of the government has the ability to alleviate the
attacks?
2. Does the story suggest that some level of the government is responsible for the attacks?
3. Does the story suggest that an individual, or group of people are responsible for the
attacks?
4. Does the story suggest solutions to the attacks?


Morality frame

1. Does the story contain any moral message?
2. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?
3. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?



Economic consequences frame

1. Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future?
2.

Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expense involved?
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3. Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of
action?


War on terror frame

1. Does the story link the attack to terrorists with global reach (ISIS, Al Qaeda..etc)?
2. Does the story emphasize on the fight against terrorism?
3. Does the story call for special powers for wartime, or demand patriotic allegiance?


Frame context
1= Thematic
2= Episodic



What are the sources used in the news story?

National official source: 1= Yes, 0= No
International official source: 1= Yes, 0= No
Witness: 1=Yes, 0=No
Expert: 1= Yes, 0=No
Religious leader: 1=Yes, 0=No
Terrorism perpetrator: 1= Yes, 0= No
People who are related to the perpetrator: 1= Yes, 0=No
Not mentioned: 1= Yes, 0= No
Other: 1= Yes, 0= No (If you choose other, please specify)


Who was blamed for the attacks?
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1= The government
2= Islamic groups
3= Terrorists
4= Suicide bomber
5= Foreign agent
6= No blame placement
7= Others (If you choose other, please specify)
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Appendix (B): Table of Acronyms
FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

IDSC

Information and Decision Support Center

ISIS

The Islamic State Group
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